Merge branch 'main' into feat/75-theming

Union conflict at the end of tests/test_core.py -- both branches appended a test block. Kept both, main's #72/#73 block first. Verified: 265 test functions = 238 baseline + 15 (#77) + 12 (theming), no duplicates.
Merge PR #77 : tolerate non-object server values; keep named sets across a merge (#72 , #73 )
2026-07-20 12:50:09 -04:00 · 2026-07-20 12:49:23 -04:00 · 2026-07-20 12:22:38 -04:00 · 2026-07-20 12:11:49 -04:00 · 2026-07-12 21:30:13 -04:00 · 2026-07-12 21:28:27 -04:00
17 changed files with 8578 additions and 123 deletions
@@ -29,25 +29,148 @@ jobs:
        run: ruff format --check .

  test:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    name: Tests (py${{ matrix.python }})
+    runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
+    name: Tests (py${{ matrix.python }} / ${{ matrix.os }})
    strategy:
      fail-fast: false
      matrix:
-        python: ["3.10", "3.12"]
+        os: [ubuntu-latest]
+        python: ["3.10", "3.12", "3.13"]
+        include:
+          # Windows tests on 3.12 only — the version the release binaries ship
+          # with. The self-hosted Windows runner blocks setup-python's install
+          # script (PowerShell execution policy), so it uses the host's `py`
+          # launcher + venv, same as release.yml.
+          - os: windows-latest
+            python: "3.12"
    steps:
      - name: Checkout
        uses: actions/checkout@v4

-      - name: Set up Python ${{ matrix.python }}
+      - name: Set up Python ${{ matrix.python }} (Linux)
+        if: runner.os == 'Linux'
        uses: actions/setup-python@v5
        with:
          python-version: ${{ matrix.python }}

+      - name: Set up Python venv (Windows)
+        if: runner.os == 'Windows'
+        shell: pwsh
+        run: |
+          py -${{ matrix.python }} -m venv .venv
+          Add-Content -Path $env:GITHUB_PATH -Value "$env:GITHUB_WORKSPACE\.venv\Scripts"
+
      # bcc_core has no GUI imports, so the test suite needs no PySide6 —
      # keeps CI fast and avoids Qt system-library headaches on the runner.
+      # cryptography is for tests/test_checksums.py (release signing helper).
      - name: Install test dependencies
-        run: pip install pytest
+        run: pip install pytest cryptography

      - name: Run tests
        run: python -m pytest -v
+
+  # ── Catalog signature gate (#61) ─────────────────────────────────────────
+  #
+  # data/catalog.json is a list of command+args entries that BCC writes into
+  # the user's Claude config, which Claude then EXECUTES. The catalog is only
+  # trusted if it carries a valid Ed25519 signature from the maintainer key.
+  #
+  # The threat this gate exists for is NOT an outsider pushing to the repo —
+  # it is the maintainer merging a friendly-looking PR without really reading
+  # it. A contributor can change catalog.json but cannot produce a matching
+  # signature, so a blindly-merged PR lands here as a RED BUILD within a
+  # minute, instead of quietly riding into the next release.
+  #
+  # Public-key verification only. No secret is used or needed.
+  catalog-signature:
+    name: Catalog signature
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.12"
+
+      - name: Install dependencies
+        run: pip install cryptography
+
+      # 🔴 TRUST ANCHOR — issue #68 finding 4.
+      #
+      # This step used to do `import bcc_core as c` FROM THE CHECKED-OUT PR
+      # BRANCH and verify the catalog against c.CATALOG_PUBKEYS — i.e. it
+      # trusted the public key shipped in the very diff it was reviewing. A
+      # PR that changed data/catalog.json AND bcc_core.CATALOG_PUBKEYS (to
+      # an attacker key, with a matching signature produced by the attacker's
+      # matching private key) went green, because there was nothing outside
+      # the PR's own content to check the key against. The gate's whole
+      # point is catching a friendly-looking PR the maintainer merges
+      # without really reading it — and that hole made it a two-file diff.
+      #
+      # EXPECTED_CATALOG_PUBKEY_B64 below is hardcoded HERE, in the workflow
+      # file, independent of whatever bcc_core.py says on the PR branch. It
+      # is intentionally the only line in this step that matters for
+      # security review: changing it changes what this gate is willing to
+      # trust. THIS CONSTANT IS A TRUST ANCHOR. A PR that changes this line
+      # in the same diff as a catalog change is exactly the attack this gate
+      # exists to prevent — review a change to this line on its own,
+      # never bundled with a catalog update.
+      #
+      # NOTE for the next key rotation: update EXPECTED_CATALOG_PUBKEY_B64
+      # below to the new key's base64 form, as its own reviewed change.
+      - name: Verify data/catalog.json.sig
+        env:
+          EXPECTED_CATALOG_PUBKEY_B64: "082NOwVB7uURkvfyS3+knJ+40Fk6C9unsF47+2uPKo4="
+        run: |
+          python - <<'PY'
+          import base64, os, pathlib, sys
+          import bcc_core as c
+
+          expected_pubkey_b64 = os.environ["EXPECTED_CATALOG_PUBKEY_B64"]
+
+          raw = pathlib.Path("data/catalog.json").read_bytes()
+          sig_path = pathlib.Path("data/catalog.json.sig")
+
+          if not sig_path.exists():
+              sys.exit("FAIL: data/catalog.json.sig is missing. The catalog must be "
+                       "signed via the Catalog Console (#62) before it can land.")
+
+          if b"\x00" * 32 in c.CATALOG_PUBKEYS:
+              sys.exit("FAIL: CATALOG_PUBKEYS still holds the placeholder key.")
+
+          # Trust anchor check FIRST, before verifying anything against
+          # bcc_core.CATALOG_PUBKEYS: a PR is not allowed to bring its own
+          # key. CATALOG_PUBKEYS on the checked-out branch must be EXACTLY
+          # the key(s) this workflow file itself expects -- no more, no
+          # fewer, no substitutions.
+          actual_pubkeys_b64 = [base64.b64encode(k).decode() for k in c.CATALOG_PUBKEYS]
+          if actual_pubkeys_b64 != [expected_pubkey_b64]:
+              sys.exit(
+                  "FAIL: bcc_core.CATALOG_PUBKEYS on this branch does not match the "
+                  "trust anchor hardcoded in .github/workflows/ci.yml.\n"
+                  f"  expected: {[expected_pubkey_b64]}\n"
+                  f"  actual:   {actual_pubkeys_b64}\n"
+                  "\n"
+                  "This PR is changing (or has changed) the catalog signing key. That "
+                  "change must be reviewed on its own, separately from any catalog "
+                  "content change, and the workflow's EXPECTED_CATALOG_PUBKEY_B64 "
+                  "updated deliberately -- not accepted because it happened to match "
+                  "whatever bcc_core.py says on this branch."
+              )
+
+          if not c.verify_catalog_signature(raw, sig_path.read_bytes(), c.CATALOG_PUBKEYS):
+              sys.exit(
+                  "FAIL: data/catalog.json does NOT match its signature.\n"
+                  "\n"
+                  "The catalog changed without being re-signed. Either someone edited\n"
+                  "it directly (a PR you merged?), or a signing pass was forgotten.\n"
+                  "Re-review and re-sign with the Catalog Console — do not bypass this."
+              )
+
+          problems = c.validate_catalog(c.load_catalog(raw))
+          if problems:
+              sys.exit("FAIL: catalog failed validation:\n  " + "\n  ".join(problems))
+
+          print("OK: catalog signature verifies, the pubkey matches the CI trust anchor, "
+                "and the catalog validates clean.")
+          PY
@@ -95,6 +95,92 @@ jobs:
          name: ${{ matrix.artifact }}
          path: ${{ matrix.artifact }}

+  # ── Signing-key smoke test (workflow_dispatch only) ─────────────────────
+  #
+  # The Publish job is gated on a tag, so a manual run never exercises the
+  # signing step — which means a wrong/missing RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY secret
+  # would only be discovered at the worst possible moment: during a real
+  # release. This job signs a throwaway manifest with the secret and verifies
+  # the result against scripts/sign_checksums.RELEASE_PUBKEYS.
+  #
+  # IMPORTANT (issue #68 finding 5): this must verify against the RELEASE
+  # public key, never bcc_core.CATALOG_PUBKEYS. The catalog key is the
+  # offline, maintainer-held root of trust for what BCC executes; it must
+  # NEVER be compared against a value that lives in a CI secret, because
+  # that comparison is itself a way to smuggle a catalog-trusted key through
+  # CI review ("does this repo secret match the catalog key" is a question
+  # this workflow must never even ask). The release key is a SEPARATE
+  # keypair, generated via `catalog_console.py keygen --release`, that only
+  # ever signs release SHA256SUMS manifests -- a CI/secret compromise burns
+  # this key, not the catalog key.
+  #
+  # It proves the two halves of the RELEASE keypair actually match, without
+  # publishing anything. Run it from the Actions tab after setting or
+  # rotating the secret.
+  signing-smoke-test:
+    name: Signing key smoke test
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    if: github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch'
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.12"
+
+      - name: Install dependencies
+        run: pip install cryptography
+
+      - name: Sign a throwaway manifest and verify against the RELEASE pubkey
+        env:
+          RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY }}
+        run: |
+          if [ -z "$RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY" ]; then
+            echo "FAIL: RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY secret is not set."
+            echo "Generate the RELEASE key (NOT the catalog key) with:"
+            echo "    python catalog_console.py keygen --release"
+            echo "then add its seed under Settings -> Actions -> Secrets, via:"
+            echo "    python catalog_console.py show-seed-b64 --release"
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          mkdir -p smoke && echo "smoke test payload" > smoke/hello.txt
+          python3 scripts/sign_checksums.py generate smoke --out smoke/SHA256SUMS
+          python3 scripts/sign_checksums.py sign --sums smoke/SHA256SUMS --out smoke/SHA256SUMS.sig
+          python - <<'PY'
+          import pathlib, sys
+          from scripts.sign_checksums import RELEASE_PUBKEYS, verify_checksums_against_any
+
+          # Deliberately does NOT import bcc_core / CATALOG_PUBKEYS at all --
+          # this smoke test must never be able to compare the CI secret
+          # against the catalog's root of trust (issue #68 finding 5). Only
+          # RELEASE_PUBKEYS (scripts/sign_checksums.py) is a legitimate
+          # target for a CI-resident key.
+          if not RELEASE_PUBKEYS:
+              sys.exit(
+                  "FAIL: scripts/sign_checksums.RELEASE_PUBKEYS is empty.\n"
+                  "\n"
+                  "Generate the release keypair with:\n"
+                  "    python catalog_console.py keygen --release\n"
+                  "then paste the printed public key into RELEASE_PUBKEYS in\n"
+                  "scripts/sign_checksums.py and commit that change."
+              )
+
+          sums = pathlib.Path("smoke/SHA256SUMS").read_text()
+          sig = pathlib.Path("smoke/SHA256SUMS.sig").read_bytes()
+
+          if not verify_checksums_against_any(RELEASE_PUBKEYS, sums, sig):
+              sys.exit(
+                  "FAIL: the signature produced by RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY does NOT verify\n"
+                  "against any key in scripts/sign_checksums.RELEASE_PUBKEYS.\n"
+                  "\n"
+                  "The secret and the shipped release public key are different keypairs.\n"
+                  "Downloaders would reject every signature this CI produces. Re-copy the\n"
+                  "seed from `catalog_console.py show-seed-b64 --release`, or update\n"
+                  "RELEASE_PUBKEYS with the matching public key."
+              )
+          print("OK: RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY matches a key in RELEASE_PUBKEYS.")
+          PY
+
  # ── Create GitHub Release with all three artifacts ──────────────────────

  release:
@@ -107,11 +193,76 @@ jobs:
      contents: write

    steps:
+      # Needed for scripts/sign_checksums.py — the release job otherwise
+      # only downloads build artifacts, it doesn't check out the repo.
+      - name: Checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
      - name: Download all artifacts
        uses: actions/download-artifact@v3
        with:
          path: artifacts

+      - name: Set up Python 3.12
+        uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.12"
+
+      # download-artifact@v3 nests each artifact under a directory named
+      # after it (artifacts/<name>/<name>). Flatten into one directory so
+      # SHA256SUMS lists plain filenames, matching what `sha256sum -c`
+      # expects when run from inside an extracted release download.
+      - name: Collect release files
+        run: |
+          mkdir -p release-files
+          find artifacts -type f -exec cp {} release-files/ \;
+          ls -la release-files
+
+      - name: Generate SHA256SUMS
+        run: python3 scripts/sign_checksums.py generate release-files --out release-files/SHA256SUMS
+
+      # ── Sign the checksum manifest (best-effort) ──────────────────────
+      #
+      # BCC binaries are not code-signed (no budget for a paid cert). This
+      # is the free half: a checksum manifest, detached-signed with
+      # Ed25519, so a tampered download is detectable by anyone who
+      # checks. It does NOT remove Gatekeeper/SmartScreen warnings.
+      #
+      # The private key is a repo secret (RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY, base64 raw
+      # Ed25519 seed) for the RELEASE key -- a SEPARATE keypair from the
+      # catalog key, generated via `python catalog_console.py keygen
+      # --release` (issue #68 finding 5; #62). This key is intentionally
+      # CI-resident and signs ONLY this checksum manifest; it is never
+      # trusted to sign data/catalog.json. If it's not set, we still
+      # publish the release — just without a .sig — rather than fail the
+      # release outright.
+      - name: Check for signing key
+        id: signing
+        run: |
+          if [ -n "${{ secrets.RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY }}" ]; then
+            echo "has_key=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          else
+            echo "has_key=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          fi
+
+      - name: Install signing dependencies
+        if: steps.signing.outputs.has_key == 'true'
+        run: pip install cryptography
+
+      - name: Sign SHA256SUMS
+        if: steps.signing.outputs.has_key == 'true'
+        env:
+          RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY }}
+        run: |
+          python3 scripts/sign_checksums.py sign \
+            --sums release-files/SHA256SUMS \
+            --out release-files/SHA256SUMS.sig
+
+      - name: Warn — release will be unsigned
+        if: steps.signing.outputs.has_key != 'true'
+        run: |
+          echo "::warning::RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY secret is not set — this release is being published WITHOUT a signed SHA256SUMS.sig. Generate the RELEASE key (python catalog_console.py keygen --release) and add its seed (python catalog_console.py show-seed-b64 --release) as this secret before the next tag."
+
      - name: Create GitHub Release
        uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2
        with:
@@ -119,7 +270,9 @@ jobs:
          draft: false
          prerelease: false
          generate_release_notes: false
-          files: artifacts/**/*
+          files: |
+            artifacts/**/*
+            release-files/SHA256SUMS*
          body: |
            ## Better Claude Config ${{ github.ref_name }}

@@ -139,5 +292,8 @@ jobs:
            xattr -cr /Applications/BetterClaudeConfig.app
            ```

+            ### Verifying your download
+            Every release includes `SHA256SUMS` (and, when the signing key is configured, a detached `SHA256SUMS.sig`). See [Verifying your download](https://git.avezzano.io/the_og/better-claude-config#verifying-your-download) in the README for commands. This proves you got the file we published — it does not remove Gatekeeper/SmartScreen warnings.
+
            ### Requirements
            No Python installation needed — the app is self-contained.
@@ -19,6 +19,103 @@ Pre-built self-contained binaries are attached to every [GitHub Release](../../r

 > **macOS Gatekeeper note:** the app is not notarized. On first launch, right-click → **Open**, or run `xattr -cr /Applications/BetterClaudeConfig.app` in a terminal.

+## Verifying your download
+
+BCC isn't code-signed — there's no budget for a paid certificate (macOS
+Developer ID, Windows Authenticode). Instead, every release publishes a
+`SHA256SUMS` file listing the checksum of each archive, detached-signed with
+Ed25519 as `SHA256SUMS.sig`. Both are attached to the release alongside the
+binaries.
+
+**What this proves:** the file you downloaded is byte-for-byte what we
+published, and the manifest itself was signed by our release key.
+
+**What this does NOT do:** it does not make the binary "safe," and it does
+**not** remove the macOS Gatekeeper or Windows SmartScreen warning — those
+are only suppressed by a paid OS-vendor certificate, which this project
+doesn't have. Verifying checksums is about detecting tampering in transit or
+on a mirror, not about vouching for the software.
+
+This manifest is signed with BCC's **release key**, which is a different
+key from the one that signs the MCP server catalog — see
+[Signing keys](#signing-keys) below for why, and for the public key value
+to use with `--pubkey-b64` below.
+
+### macOS / Linux
+
+```bash
+# From inside the folder you downloaded the release files into:
+sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS
+```
+
+If your `sha256sum` complains about missing files, download `SHA256SUMS`
+into the same directory as the archive you downloaded — it lists every
+platform's archive, and only the one(s) present will be checked.
+
+To also verify the manifest's signature (optional, requires Python +
+`pip install cryptography` and a checkout of this repo):
+
+```bash
+python3 scripts/sign_checksums.py verify \
+  --sums SHA256SUMS --sig SHA256SUMS.sig \
+  --pubkey-b64 "<the release public key from Signing keys, below>"
+```
+
+### Windows (PowerShell)
+
+```powershell
+Get-FileHash .\BetterClaudeConfig-Windows.zip -Algorithm SHA256
+```
+
+Compare the printed hash (case-insensitively) against the matching line in
+`SHA256SUMS`.
+
+### If a release has no `SHA256SUMS.sig`
+
+The signing key is a repo secret that has to be configured manually; if a
+release is missing the `.sig` file, the checksums themselves are still
+valid and safe to check against — the release workflow only skips signing,
+never checksum generation.
+
+## Signing keys
+
+BCC uses **two separate Ed25519 keypairs**, deliberately never the same
+key, because they protect different things and live in different places:
+
+| | Catalog key | Release key |
+|---|---|---|
+| Signs | `data/catalog.json` (the MCP server catalog every user's app trusts) | `SHA256SUMS` (the checksum manifest for release binaries) |
+| Verified by | `bcc_core.CATALOG_PUBKEYS` | `scripts/sign_checksums.RELEASE_PUBKEYS` |
+| Lives | Offline, passphrase-encrypted, maintainer's machine only (OS keychain or an encrypted file outside the repo — see the [Catalog Console](#files), issue #62) | A Gitea Actions repo secret, `RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY` — **intentionally CI-resident** |
+| Generated with | `python catalog_console.py keygen` | `python catalog_console.py keygen --release` |
+| Exported for CI with | *(never — there is no supported way to export this key)* | `python catalog_console.py show-seed-b64 --release` |
+
+**Why two keys:** the catalog key is the root of trust for what BCC
+actually *executes* on a user's machine — every `command`/`args` pair in
+the shipped catalog is only there because this key signed it. If that key
+and the release-checksum key were the same (as they briefly were — see
+[issue #68](../../issues/68)), then anything that can exfiltrate a Gitea
+Actions secret (a malicious workflow-file PR, a compromised runner, a leaky
+log) could sign a catalog every user's copy of BCC would trust, not just a
+checksum manifest. Splitting them means **a CI/secret compromise burns the
+release key, never the catalog key** — checksums for a future release could
+be forged, which is bad, but no attacker gains the ability to make BCC run
+arbitrary commands on installs that trust the catalog. That asymmetry is
+the entire point of having two keys instead of one.
+
+The catalog key is **never** meant to leave the maintainer's machine: it's
+generated, stored, unlocked, and used to sign entirely inside the Catalog
+Console (`catalog_console.py`), and `catalog_console.py show-seed-b64`
+refuses to run without `--release` specifically so the catalog seed can't
+be exported by habit or muscle memory.
+
+**Release signing public key** (Ed25519, base64, raw 32 bytes) — this is
+the RELEASE key, not the catalog key:
+
+```
+<PLACEHOLDER — AJ: paste the release public key from `catalog_console.py keygen --release` here>
+```
+
 ## Run from source

 ```bash
@@ -92,6 +189,8 @@ file is also listed, marked *legacy*, so you can copy them over.
 - `test_core.py` — unit suite for the core (`python test_core.py`).
 - `bcc.spec` — PyInstaller build spec (cross-platform).
 - `scripts/build_icons.py` — regenerates `icons/app.icns` and `icons/app.ico` from source PNGs.
+- `scripts/sign_checksums.py` — generates and Ed25519-signs the release `SHA256SUMS` manifest (see [Verifying your download](#verifying-your-download)).
+- `catalog_console.py` / `catalog_review.py` — **maintainer-only**, never shipped to users (excluded from `bcc.spec`; see `tests/test_catalog_console_packaging.py`). The Catalog Console: review + sign `data/catalog.json`, and generate/manage both signing keys (`keygen`, `keygen --release`) — see [Signing keys](#signing-keys).

 ## Building from source

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ a = Analysis(
    ["bcc.py"],
    pathex=[],
    binaries=[],
-    datas=[],
+    datas=[("icons", "icons"), ("data/catalog.json", "data")],
    hiddenimports=[],
    hookspath=[],
    hooksconfig={},
@@ -78,8 +78,8 @@ if sys.platform == "darwin":
        info_plist={
            "CFBundleName": "Better Claude Config",
            "CFBundleDisplayName": "Better Claude Config",
-            "CFBundleShortVersionString": "1.0.0",
-            "CFBundleVersion": "1.0.0",
+            "CFBundleShortVersionString": "1.3.0",
+            "CFBundleVersion": "1.3.0",
            "NSHighResolutionCapable": True,
            "NSRequiresAquaSystemAppearance": False,  # supports dark mode
            "LSMinimumSystemVersion": "11.0",
@@ -0,0 +1,818 @@
+"""
+catalog_review.py -- pure, GUI-free review/diff/risk/crypto logic for the
+Catalog Console (issue #62).
+
+This module is deliberately Qt-free and network-free so every function in it
+is unit-testable offline, exactly like bcc_core.py. catalog_console.py (the
+PySide6 GUI) is a thin shell over these functions -- it owns Qt widgets,
+subprocess/git calls, and HTTP registry lookups; this module owns judgment.
+
+Nothing here is reimplemented from bcc_core: the command allowlist and the
+signature domain-separation prefix are imported, not retyped, so the two
+modules cannot silently drift apart (see bcc_core.validate_catalog /
+bcc_core.verify_catalog_signature and the project's "the check drifted on a
+new surface" recurring-bug lesson).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import re
+from collections.abc import Callable
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from urllib.parse import urlsplit
+
+from bcc_core import _CATALOG_SIG_DOMAIN as CATALOG_SIG_DOMAIN
+from bcc_core import CATALOG_ALLOWED_COMMANDS
+from bcc_core import verify_catalog_signature as _verify_catalog_signature
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Semantic diff
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+# Top-level scalar/simple fields compared directly (not drilled into).
+_DIFF_FIELDS = (
+    "display",
+    "description",
+    "category",
+    "official",
+    "setup",
+    "homepage",
+    "docs_url",
+    "source",
+    "notes",
+    "stars",
+    "last_release",
+    "env_required",
+)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class FieldChange:
+    """One field that differs between the old and new version of an entry."""
+
+    field: str
+    old: object
+    new: object
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class EntryChange:
+    """One catalog entry's change: added, removed, or changed.
+
+    `old`/`new` are the raw entry dicts (or None for added/removed) so risk
+    predicates and the GUI can inspect anything not captured by
+    `field_changes` (which only lists fields that actually differ).
+    """
+
+    entry_id: str
+    status: str  # "added" | "removed" | "changed"
+    old: dict | None
+    new: dict | None
+    field_changes: tuple[FieldChange, ...] = ()
+
+
+def _config_field_changes(old_cfg: dict | None, new_cfg: dict | None) -> list[FieldChange]:
+    old_cfg = old_cfg or {}
+    new_cfg = new_cfg or {}
+    changes: list[FieldChange] = []
+    for f in ("command", "args", "env"):
+        ov, nv = old_cfg.get(f), new_cfg.get(f)
+        if ov != nv:
+            changes.append(FieldChange(f"config.{f}", ov, nv))
+    return changes
+
+
+def _entry_field_changes(old_entry: dict, new_entry: dict) -> tuple[FieldChange, ...]:
+    changes: list[FieldChange] = []
+    for f in _DIFF_FIELDS:
+        ov, nv = old_entry.get(f), new_entry.get(f)
+        if ov != nv:
+            changes.append(FieldChange(f, ov, nv))
+    changes.extend(_config_field_changes(old_entry.get("config"), new_entry.get("config")))
+    return tuple(changes)
+
+
+def diff_catalogs(old: dict | None, new: dict | None) -> list[EntryChange]:
+    """Semantic (per-entry) diff between two parsed catalog dicts.
+
+    NOT a text diff: entries are matched by `id`, and each changed entry
+    reports exactly which fields differ (with before/after values), which is
+    what lets the Console render "command changed from X to Y" instead of a
+    JSON line diff a reviewer has to mentally reconstruct.
+
+    Entries missing/malformed `id` are ignored here -- that is a
+    validate_catalog() rejection, not a diffing concern, and diffing must not
+    silently invent a match for two differently-broken entries.
+    """
+    old_servers = {
+        e["id"]: e
+        for e in (old or {}).get("servers", []) or []
+        if isinstance(e, dict) and isinstance(e.get("id"), str) and e.get("id")
+    }
+    new_servers = {
+        e["id"]: e
+        for e in (new or {}).get("servers", []) or []
+        if isinstance(e, dict) and isinstance(e.get("id"), str) and e.get("id")
+    }
+
+    changes: list[EntryChange] = []
+    for entry_id in sorted(set(old_servers) | set(new_servers)):
+        old_e = old_servers.get(entry_id)
+        new_e = new_servers.get(entry_id)
+        if old_e is None:
+            changes.append(EntryChange(entry_id, "added", None, new_e, ()))
+        elif new_e is None:
+            changes.append(EntryChange(entry_id, "removed", old_e, None, ()))
+        elif old_e != new_e:
+            fc = _entry_field_changes(old_e, new_e)
+            if fc:
+                changes.append(EntryChange(entry_id, "changed", old_e, new_e, fc))
+    return changes
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Risk annotations -- each predicate is pure and independently unit-tested.
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RiskFinding:
+    severity: str  # "blocking" | "warning" | "info"
+    code: str
+    message: str
+
+
+def _escape_non_ascii(s: str) -> str:
+    """Render a string with any non-ASCII code point shown as an escape
+    sequence, so a homoglyph/RTL-override character can't visually pass as
+    the real thing in the review UI."""
+    return s.encode("unicode_escape").decode("ascii")
+
+
+def risk_env_required(change: EntryChange) -> list[RiskFinding]:
+    """A non-empty env_required value is blocking: catalog entries must ship
+    only the *names* of env vars the user fills in, never values."""
+    entry = change.new or {}
+    env_required = entry.get("env_required")
+    findings: list[RiskFinding] = []
+    if isinstance(env_required, dict):
+        for k, v in env_required.items():
+            if v not in (None, ""):
+                findings.append(
+                    RiskFinding(
+                        "blocking",
+                        "env_required_value",
+                        f"env_required[{k!r}] carries a non-empty value -- catalog "
+                        "entries must never ship secret values, only placeholder names.",
+                    )
+                )
+    return findings
+
+
+def risk_command_allowlist(change: EntryChange) -> list[RiskFinding]:
+    """A command outside bcc_core.CATALOG_ALLOWED_COMMANDS is blocking.
+    Imports the allowlist rather than redefining it."""
+    entry = change.new or {}
+    config = entry.get("config") or {}
+    command = config.get("command")
+    if isinstance(command, str) and command and command not in CATALOG_ALLOWED_COMMANDS:
+        return [
+            RiskFinding(
+                "blocking",
+                "command_not_allowed",
+                f"command {command!r} is not on the catalog allowlist "
+                f"({', '.join(sorted(CATALOG_ALLOWED_COMMANDS))}).",
+            )
+        ]
+    return []
+
+
+def risk_non_ascii(change: EntryChange) -> list[RiskFinding]:
+    """Non-ASCII code points in id/command/args are blocking -- homoglyph /
+    RTL-override typosquatting can make a malicious package name visually
+    identical to a legitimate one in a naive diff view."""
+    entry = change.new or {}
+    findings: list[RiskFinding] = []
+
+    entry_id = entry.get("id")
+    if isinstance(entry_id, str) and not entry_id.isascii():
+        findings.append(
+            RiskFinding(
+                "blocking",
+                "non_ascii_id",
+                f"id contains non-ASCII code points: {_escape_non_ascii(entry_id)!r}",
+            )
+        )
+
+    config = entry.get("config") or {}
+    command = config.get("command")
+    if isinstance(command, str) and not command.isascii():
+        findings.append(
+            RiskFinding(
+                "blocking",
+                "non_ascii_command",
+                f"command contains non-ASCII code points: {_escape_non_ascii(command)!r}",
+            )
+        )
+
+    for a in config.get("args") or []:
+        if isinstance(a, str) and not a.isascii():
+            findings.append(
+                RiskFinding(
+                    "blocking",
+                    "non_ascii_arg",
+                    f"arg contains non-ASCII code points: {_escape_non_ascii(a)!r}",
+                )
+            )
+
+    return findings
+
+
+def _npm_candidate_args(command: str | None, args: list[str]) -> list[str]:
+    if command != "npx":
+        return []
+    return [a for a in args if isinstance(a, str) and a and not a.startswith("-")]
+
+
+def split_npm_spec(spec: str) -> tuple[str, str | None]:
+    """Split an npm package spec into (name, version). version is None if
+    unpinned. Handles scoped (@scope/name@version) and unscoped
+    (name@version) specs."""
+    if spec.startswith("@"):
+        rest = spec[1:]
+        if "/" not in rest:
+            return spec, None  # malformed scope, can't tell -- treat unpinned
+        scope, _, remainder = rest.partition("/")
+        if "@" in remainder:
+            pkg_name, _, version = remainder.partition("@")
+            return f"@{scope}/{pkg_name}", (version or None)
+        return f"@{scope}/{remainder}", None
+    if "@" in spec:
+        name, _, version = spec.partition("@")
+        return name, (version or None)
+    return spec, None
+
+
+def is_pinned_npm_spec(spec: str) -> bool:
+    _name, version = split_npm_spec(spec)
+    return bool(version)
+
+
+_DOCKER_VALUE_FLAGS = {
+    "-e",
+    "--env",
+    "-v",
+    "--volume",
+    "-p",
+    "--publish",
+    "-w",
+    "--workdir",
+    "-u",
+    "--user",
+    "--name",
+    "--network",
+    "--entrypoint",
+}
+
+
+def docker_image_candidates(args: list[str]) -> list[str]:
+    """Best-effort extraction of the image reference from a `docker run
+    [OPTIONS] IMAGE [CMD...]` args list: the first positional token after
+    any leading `run` and flag(+value) pairs."""
+    candidates: list[str] = []
+    i = 0
+    while i < len(args):
+        a = args[i]
+        if a == "run":
+            i += 1
+            continue
+        if isinstance(a, str) and a.startswith("-"):
+            if "=" not in a and a in _DOCKER_VALUE_FLAGS:
+                i += 2
+                continue
+            i += 1
+            continue
+        if isinstance(a, str):
+            candidates.append(a)
+        break  # first positional token after `run` is the image ref
+    return candidates
+
+
+def is_pinned_docker_image(image: str) -> bool:
+    if "@sha256:" in image:
+        return True
+    tag_part = image.rsplit("/", 1)[-1]
+    if ":" not in tag_part:
+        return False  # no tag => implicit :latest
+    tag = tag_part.rsplit(":", 1)[-1]
+    return bool(tag) and tag != "latest"
+
+
+def risk_unpinned_package(change: EntryChange) -> list[RiskFinding]:
+    """Every entry must pin an exact version: an `@scope/pkg` npm arg with
+    no `@version`, or a docker image with no tag / `:latest`, is blocking.
+    A later-compromised package must not be able to auto-upgrade into every
+    user just because the catalog entry never pinned a version."""
+    entry = change.new or {}
+    config = entry.get("config") or {}
+    command = config.get("command")
+    args = config.get("args") or []
+    findings: list[RiskFinding] = []
+
+    if command == "npx":
+        for a in _npm_candidate_args(command, args):
+            if not is_pinned_npm_spec(a):
+                findings.append(
+                    RiskFinding(
+                        "blocking",
+                        "unpinned_npm_package",
+                        f"npm package arg {a!r} has no pinned @version.",
+                    )
+                )
+    elif command == "docker":
+        for img in docker_image_candidates(args):
+            if not is_pinned_docker_image(img):
+                findings.append(
+                    RiskFinding(
+                        "blocking",
+                        "unpinned_docker_image",
+                        f"docker image {img!r} is not pinned to an exact tag "
+                        "(uses :latest or no tag).",
+                    )
+                )
+
+    return findings
+
+
+_URL_FIELDS = ("homepage", "docs_url", "source")
+
+
+def _domain(url: str) -> str:
+    try:
+        return urlsplit(url).netloc.lower()
+    except ValueError:
+        return ""
+
+
+def risk_url_domain_change(change: EntryChange) -> list[RiskFinding]:
+    """Non-https URLs and, more importantly, a *domain change* on any URL
+    field are surfaced loudly with old-vs-new domains broken out -- the
+    lookalike-domain-swap defence."""
+    findings: list[RiskFinding] = []
+    old_entry = change.old or {}
+    new_entry = change.new or {}
+
+    for f in _URL_FIELDS:
+        new_url = new_entry.get(f)
+        if not isinstance(new_url, str) or not new_url:
+            continue
+        if not new_url.startswith("https://"):
+            findings.append(
+                RiskFinding("warning", "non_https_url", f"{f} is not https://: {new_url!r}")
+            )
+        old_url = old_entry.get(f)
+        if isinstance(old_url, str) and old_url:
+            old_domain, new_domain = _domain(old_url), _domain(new_url)
+            if old_domain and new_domain and old_domain != new_domain:
+                findings.append(
+                    RiskFinding(
+                        "warning",
+                        "domain_changed",
+                        f"{f} domain changed from {old_domain!r} to {new_domain!r} -- "
+                        "verify this isn't a lookalike-domain swap.",
+                    )
+                )
+    return findings
+
+
+def risk_new_entry(change: EntryChange) -> list[RiskFinding]:
+    """A brand-new entry is flagged for extra scrutiny -- not blocking on its
+    own, but it's the category of change the registry lookup exists for."""
+    if change.status == "added":
+        return [
+            RiskFinding(
+                "info",
+                "new_entry",
+                "Brand-new catalog entry -- extra scrutiny: check publisher identity "
+                "via the registry lookup before signing.",
+            )
+        ]
+    return []
+
+
+_RISK_PREDICATES: tuple[Callable[[EntryChange], list[RiskFinding]], ...] = (
+    risk_env_required,
+    risk_command_allowlist,
+    risk_non_ascii,
+    risk_unpinned_package,
+    risk_url_domain_change,
+    risk_new_entry,
+)
+
+
+def entry_risk_findings(change: EntryChange) -> list[RiskFinding]:
+    """Run every risk predicate against one entry change and return the
+    combined findings (order matches _RISK_PREDICATES)."""
+    findings: list[RiskFinding] = []
+    for predicate in _RISK_PREDICATES:
+        findings.extend(predicate(change))
+    return findings
+
+
+def has_blocking_risk(change: EntryChange) -> bool:
+    return any(f.severity == "blocking" for f in entry_risk_findings(change))
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Review session: acknowledge-gating + TOCTOU blob-SHA pinning
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+@dataclass
+class ReviewSession:
+    """State for one review pass. `pinned_blob_sha` is the git blob SHA of
+    data/catalog.json as it existed the moment review began -- see
+    can_sign()/sign_precondition().
+
+    `loaded_ref` is the exact ref this review was loaded from ("main", or a
+    PR's `refs/pull/<n>/head`) -- see issue #68 finding 1. It exists so the
+    Sign path can re-resolve the TOCTOU blob SHA from *the ref that was
+    actually reviewed*, instead of a hardcoded "main" that silently diverges
+    from the reviewed ref on every PR review (the bug that made the PR path
+    unable to sign at all, and forced everyone onto the vacuous
+    main-vs-itself path instead).
+    """
+
+    pinned_blob_sha: str
+    old_catalog: dict
+    new_catalog: dict
+    loaded_ref: str = "main"
+    changes: list[EntryChange] = field(default_factory=list)
+    acknowledged: set[str] = field(default_factory=set)
+
+    def __post_init__(self) -> None:
+        if not self.changes:
+            self.changes = diff_catalogs(self.old_catalog, self.new_catalog)
+
+
+def start_review(
+    pinned_blob_sha: str,
+    old_catalog: dict,
+    new_catalog: dict,
+    loaded_ref: str = "main",
+) -> ReviewSession:
+    return ReviewSession(
+        pinned_blob_sha=pinned_blob_sha,
+        old_catalog=old_catalog,
+        new_catalog=new_catalog,
+        loaded_ref=loaded_ref,
+    )
+
+
+def find_last_signed_catalog_raw(
+    candidates: list[bytes], sig: bytes, pubkeys: list[bytes]
+) -> bytes | None:
+    """Given `candidates` (candidate raw catalog.json byte-strings -- e.g.
+    successive historical versions from git log, most-recent-first),
+    return the first one whose signature verifies against `sig`/`pubkeys`,
+    or None if none do.
+
+    This is how source="main" review diffs against "the last catalog a
+    maintainer actually signed" instead of against itself (issue #68
+    finding 1): `catalog_console.last_signed_catalog_raw` walks
+    data/catalog.json's git history on main and hands the candidates here.
+    """
+    for raw in candidates:
+        if _verify_catalog_signature(raw, sig, pubkeys):
+            return raw
+    return None
+
+
+def acknowledge_entry(session: ReviewSession, entry_id: str) -> None:
+    ids = {c.entry_id for c in session.changes}
+    if entry_id not in ids:
+        raise ValueError(f"{entry_id!r} is not part of this review session's diff.")
+    session.acknowledged.add(entry_id)
+
+
+def unacknowledge_entry(session: ReviewSession, entry_id: str) -> None:
+    session.acknowledged.discard(entry_id)
+
+
+def all_entries_acknowledged(session: ReviewSession) -> bool:
+    return {c.entry_id for c in session.changes} <= session.acknowledged
+
+
+# NOTE for future editors: do NOT add an "acknowledge all" shortcut here, now
+# or ever. The friction of individually acknowledging every changed entry is
+# the entire point of this tool (issue #62) -- a shortcut would let a tired
+# reviewer rubber-stamp a diff exactly like the "merge PR, run script, push"
+# reflex this Console exists to replace. If this comment is the only thing
+# stopping you, that is the point: it is stopping you on purpose.
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class SignDecision:
+    ok: bool
+    reason: str | None = None
+
+
+def can_sign(session: ReviewSession, current_blob_sha: str) -> SignDecision:
+    """Whether the Sign button may fire right now.
+
+    Four independent gates, all required, checked in this order:
+
+    0. The diff must be non-empty. An empty diff historically meant "Sign
+       unlocks instantly" (`set() <= set()` is vacuously True), which is
+       exactly backwards: a vacuously-satisfied gate is worse than no gate
+       at all, because it *manufactures confidence* -- the signature looks
+       identical to one produced by a real review. "Nothing changed" must
+       mean "nothing to sign", never "sign unlocked". (Issue #68 finding 1;
+       this is what let commit b08cf21 sign all 19 entries with zero of them
+       ever reviewed.)
+    1. TOCTOU: `current_blob_sha` (fetched fresh, immediately before signing,
+       from the ref that was actually reviewed -- see sign_precondition())
+       must match the blob SHA pinned when review began. If the bytes on the
+       remote changed since -- a new commit pushed to the same PR, a
+       force-push, another PR merged in between -- signing is refused and a
+       re-review is forced. This is what makes "signing is the approval act"
+       true rather than aspirational: the signature is bound to the exact
+       reviewed bytes, not to "whatever the file happens to be now".
+    2. No blocking risk finding may be outstanding on ANY changed entry, full
+       stop -- checked here, not just in the GUI. The GUI additionally
+       disables the acknowledge checkbox for a blocking entry, but that is a
+       UI nicety, not the enforcement point: if this pure gate didn't also
+       check it, a blocking risk would only be stopped by the GUI happening
+       to have wired the checkbox correctly, and nothing would catch a
+       regression in that wiring. The GUI must not be the only thing
+       standing between a blocking risk and a signature.
+    3. Every changed entry in the diff must be individually acknowledged.
+    """
+    if not session.changes:
+        return SignDecision(
+            False,
+            "Nothing to sign: this review's diff is empty. If you expected "
+            "changes here, you may be diffing the wrong source/ref.",
+        )
+    if current_blob_sha != session.pinned_blob_sha:
+        return SignDecision(
+            False,
+            "The reviewed bytes changed since this review began (blob SHA "
+            "mismatch) -- re-review required before signing.",
+        )
+    blocking_ids = sorted({c.entry_id for c in session.changes if has_blocking_risk(c)})
+    if blocking_ids:
+        return SignDecision(
+            False,
+            "Blocking risk finding(s) outstanding on: "
+            f"{', '.join(blocking_ids)} -- fix the underlying change, do not sign around it.",
+        )
+    if not all_entries_acknowledged(session):
+        pending = sorted({c.entry_id for c in session.changes} - session.acknowledged)
+        return SignDecision(
+            False, f"Not every changed entry has been acknowledged yet: {', '.join(pending)}"
+        )
+    return SignDecision(True, None)
+
+
+def sign_precondition(
+    session: ReviewSession, resolve_blob_sha: Callable[[str], str]
+) -> SignDecision:
+    """The real Sign-button gate: resolves the current TOCTOU blob SHA from
+    *the ref this session was actually loaded from* (`session.loaded_ref`),
+    never a hardcoded "main", then delegates to can_sign().
+
+    `resolve_blob_sha` is injected so this stays testable without git/Qt --
+    catalog_console.ReviewWindow._on_sign passes a real resolver
+    (fetch_ref + blob_sha_at against self.repo_dir); tests pass a fake
+    dict-backed lookup. This is the fix for issue #68 finding 1's first bug:
+    `_on_sign` used to hardcode `fetch_ref(self.repo_dir, "main")` as the
+    comparison ref, so for any PR review (where `loaded_ref` is the PR's
+    head, not main) the SHAs differed by definition and Sign could never
+    fire -- and the retry path re-called the same hardcoded resolver, so it
+    re-pinned the same wrong value and looped forever instead of forcing a
+    genuine re-review.
+    """
+    current_blob_sha = resolve_blob_sha(session.loaded_ref)
+    return can_sign(session, current_blob_sha)
+
+
+def catalog_signing_message(raw_bytes: bytes) -> bytes:
+    """The exact bytes that get signed: bcc_core's domain-separation prefix
+    (imported, never retyped) + the raw catalog bytes. Using this function
+    guarantees the Console's signature and bcc_core.verify_catalog_signature
+    can never drift apart on the prefix."""
+    return CATALOG_SIG_DOMAIN + raw_bytes
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Key management: passphrase-encrypted-at-rest Ed25519 seed
+#
+# The private key is NEVER stored plaintext, never an env var, never
+# committed. encrypt_private_key/decrypt_private_key are pure and offline
+# (scrypt KDF + AES-256-GCM via `cryptography`, already a project
+# dependency); catalog_console.py decides WHERE the resulting blob lives
+# (OS keychain if available, else a file outside the repo).
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+_KDF_SALT_LEN = 16
+_KDF_N = 2**15  # scrypt cost parameter, tuned for a one-off interactive unlock
+_KDF_R = 8
+_KDF_P = 1
+_NONCE_LEN = 12
+_AAD = b"bcc-catalog-console-key-v1"
+
+
+def _derive_key(passphrase: str, salt: bytes) -> bytes:
+    from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.scrypt import Scrypt
+
+    kdf = Scrypt(salt=salt, length=32, n=_KDF_N, r=_KDF_R, p=_KDF_P)
+    return kdf.derive(passphrase.encode("utf-8"))
+
+
+def generate_keypair() -> tuple[bytes, bytes]:
+    """Generate a new Ed25519 keypair. Returns (seed_32_bytes, pubkey_32_bytes)."""
+    from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
+    from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import Encoding, PublicFormat
+
+    private_key = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate()
+    seed = private_key.private_bytes_raw()
+    pubkey = private_key.public_key().public_bytes(Encoding.Raw, PublicFormat.Raw)
+    return seed, pubkey
+
+
+def encrypt_private_key(seed: bytes, passphrase: str) -> bytes:
+    """Encrypt a 32-byte Ed25519 seed at rest with a passphrase. Returns a
+    self-contained blob: salt || nonce || ciphertext+tag."""
+    from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead import AESGCM
+
+    if len(seed) != 32:
+        raise ValueError(f"expected a 32-byte raw Ed25519 seed, got {len(seed)} bytes")
+    if not passphrase:
+        raise ValueError("a non-empty passphrase is required")
+    salt = os.urandom(_KDF_SALT_LEN)
+    key = _derive_key(passphrase, salt)
+    nonce = os.urandom(_NONCE_LEN)
+    ciphertext = AESGCM(key).encrypt(nonce, seed, _AAD)
+    return salt + nonce + ciphertext
+
+
+def decrypt_private_key(blob: bytes, passphrase: str) -> bytes:
+    """Decrypt a blob produced by encrypt_private_key. Raises ValueError on a
+    wrong passphrase or corrupt blob -- never silently returns garbage."""
+    from cryptography.exceptions import InvalidTag
+    from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead import AESGCM
+
+    if len(blob) < _KDF_SALT_LEN + _NONCE_LEN:
+        raise ValueError("key blob is too short to be valid")
+    salt = blob[:_KDF_SALT_LEN]
+    nonce = blob[_KDF_SALT_LEN : _KDF_SALT_LEN + _NONCE_LEN]
+    ciphertext = blob[_KDF_SALT_LEN + _NONCE_LEN :]
+    key = _derive_key(passphrase, salt)
+    try:
+        return AESGCM(key).decrypt(nonce, ciphertext, _AAD)
+    except InvalidTag as e:
+        raise ValueError("wrong passphrase or corrupted key file") from e
+
+
+def sign_catalog_bytes(raw: bytes, seed: bytes) -> bytes:
+    """Sign `raw` catalog bytes with a 32-byte Ed25519 seed, using the exact
+    domain-separated message bcc_core.verify_catalog_signature expects."""
+    from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
+
+    if len(seed) != 32:
+        raise ValueError(f"expected a 32-byte raw Ed25519 seed, got {len(seed)} bytes")
+    private_key = Ed25519PrivateKey.from_private_bytes(seed)
+    return private_key.sign(catalog_signing_message(raw))
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Registry lookup -- the check a human genuinely can't do.
+#
+# The network call itself is injected (a `Fetcher` callable) so this stays
+# testable offline; catalog_console.py supplies the real npm/PyPI HTTP
+# fetcher. Fails soft everywhere: a fetcher returning None/raising just
+# yields RegistryInfo(available=False), never an exception into the caller
+# and never a block on review.
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class PackageRef:
+    entry_id: str
+    ecosystem: str  # "npm" | "pypi"
+    name: str
+    version: str | None
+
+
+def split_pypi_spec(spec: str) -> tuple[str, str | None]:
+    for sep in ("==", "@"):
+        if sep in spec:
+            name, _, version = spec.partition(sep)
+            return name, (version or None)
+    return spec, None
+
+
+def extract_package_refs(entry: dict) -> list[PackageRef]:
+    """Pull out the package(s) a basic-tier entry's args reference, for the
+    registry lookup. Returns [] for link-only entries or entries whose
+    command isn't npx/uvx (docker images aren't registry-lookup candidates
+    in the npm/PyPI sense used here)."""
+    config = entry.get("config") or {}
+    command = config.get("command")
+    args = config.get("args") or []
+    entry_id = entry.get("id", "") if isinstance(entry.get("id"), str) else ""
+    refs: list[PackageRef] = []
+
+    if command == "npx":
+        for a in _npm_candidate_args(command, args):
+            name, version = split_npm_spec(a)
+            if name:
+                refs.append(PackageRef(entry_id, "npm", name, version))
+    elif command == "uvx":
+        for a in args:
+            if isinstance(a, str) and a and not a.startswith("-"):
+                name, version = split_pypi_spec(a)
+                if name:
+                    refs.append(PackageRef(entry_id, "pypi", name, version))
+                break  # `uvx <pkg>` -- first positional token is the package
+
+    return refs
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RegistryInfo:
+    ref: PackageRef
+    available: bool
+    publisher: str | None = None
+    age_days: int | None = None
+    last_release: str | None = None
+    downloads: int | None = None
+    near_neighbor_ids: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+
+
+Fetcher = Callable[[PackageRef], dict | None]
+
+
+def edit_distance(a: str, b: str) -> int:
+    """Levenshtein distance, iterative DP (no recursion depth concerns)."""
+    if a == b:
+        return 0
+    la, lb = len(a), len(b)
+    if la == 0:
+        return lb
+    if lb == 0:
+        return la
+    prev = list(range(lb + 1))
+    for i, ca in enumerate(a, 1):
+        cur = [i] + [0] * lb
+        for j, cb in enumerate(b, 1):
+            cost = 0 if ca == cb else 1
+            cur[j] = min(prev[j] + 1, cur[j - 1] + 1, prev[j - 1] + cost)
+        prev = cur
+    return prev[lb]
+
+
+def near_neighbor_ids(name: str, other_ids: list[str], max_distance: int = 2) -> list[str]:
+    """Catalog ids within `max_distance` edits of `name` (case-insensitive),
+    excluding an exact match -- the dependency-confusion / typosquat
+    near-neighbour warning."""
+    lname = name.lower()
+    return [
+        oid
+        for oid in other_ids
+        if oid != name and edit_distance(lname, oid.lower()) <= max_distance
+    ]
+
+
+def lookup_registry_info(
+    ref: PackageRef, fetcher: Fetcher, all_entry_ids: list[str]
+) -> RegistryInfo:
+    """Resolve one package against the live registry via the injected
+    fetcher. Never raises: any fetcher exception or falsy return means
+    `available=False` ("unavailable"), which the GUI renders plainly rather
+    than blocking or erroring the review."""
+    neighbors = tuple(near_neighbor_ids(ref.name, all_entry_ids))
+    try:
+        raw = fetcher(ref)
+    except Exception:
+        raw = None
+    if not raw:
+        return RegistryInfo(ref=ref, available=False, near_neighbor_ids=neighbors)
+    return RegistryInfo(
+        ref=ref,
+        available=True,
+        publisher=raw.get("publisher"),
+        age_days=raw.get("age_days"),
+        last_release=raw.get("last_release"),
+        downloads=raw.get("downloads"),
+        near_neighbor_ids=neighbors,
+    )
+
+
+_NON_ASCII_RE = re.compile(r"[^\x00-\x7f]")
+
+
+def contains_non_ascii(s: str) -> bool:
+    return bool(_NON_ASCII_RE.search(s))
@@ -0,0 +1,454 @@
+{
+  "schema": 1,
+  "version": 1,
+  "updated": "2026-07-12",
+  "signed_at": "2026-07-12T21:35:19Z",
+  "servers": [
+    {
+      "id": "filesystem",
+      "display": "Filesystem",
+      "description": "Lets Claude read, write, search, and edit files in directories you explicitly allow.",
+      "category": "files",
+      "homepage": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/servers/tree/main/src/filesystem",
+      "stars": 85995,
+      "official": true,
+      "setup": "basic",
+      "config": {
+        "command": "npx",
+        "args": [
+          "-y",
+          "@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem@2026.7.10",
+          "<ALLOWED_DIR>"
+        ]
+      },
+      "placeholders": {
+        "<ALLOWED_DIR>": "Absolute path to a directory the server may read/write. Add more directories as additional args."
+      },
+      "env_required": {},
+      "docs_url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/servers/tree/main/src/filesystem",
+      "notes": "Part of the official modelcontextprotocol/servers reference monorepo (star count is for the whole repo). Clients that support MCP 'roots' can also grant directories dynamically instead of via args.",
+      "last_release": "2026-07-10"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "fetch",
+      "display": "Fetch",
+      "description": "Fetches a URL and converts the page to clean markdown so Claude can read web content.",
+      "category": "dev",
+      "homepage": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/servers/tree/main/src/fetch",
+      "stars": 85995,
+      "official": true,
+      "setup": "basic",
+      "config": {
+        "command": "uvx",
+        "args": [
+          "mcp-server-fetch@2026.7.10"
+        ]
+      },
+      "placeholders": {},
+      "env_required": {},
+      "docs_url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/servers/tree/main/src/fetch",
+      "notes": "Can access local/internal IPs, so treat as a mild security risk on untrusted networks. Add '--ignore-robots-txt' or '--user-agent=...' as extra args if needed.",
+      "last_release": "2026-07-10"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "memory",
+      "display": "Memory",
+      "description": "Gives Claude a persistent knowledge-graph memory that survives across conversations.",
+      "category": "ai",
+      "homepage": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/servers/tree/main/src/memory",
+      "stars": 85995,
+      "official": true,
+      "setup": "basic",
+      "config": {
+        "command": "npx",
+        "args": [
+          "-y",
+          "@modelcontextprotocol/server-memory@2026.7.4"
+        ]
+      },
+      "placeholders": {},
+      "env_required": {},
+      "docs_url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/servers/tree/main/src/memory",
+      "notes": "Stores entities/relations as a local JSON knowledge graph (path configurable via MEMORY_FILE_PATH env var).",
+      "last_release": "2026-07-04"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "sequential-thinking",
+      "display": "Sequential Thinking",
+      "description": "Gives Claude a structured, step-by-step reasoning tool for breaking down complex problems.",
+      "category": "ai",
+      "homepage": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/servers/tree/main/src/sequentialthinking",
+      "stars": 85995,
+      "official": true,
+      "setup": "basic",
+      "config": {
+        "command": "npx",
+        "args": [
+          "-y",
+          "@modelcontextprotocol/server-sequential-thinking@2026.7.4"
+        ]
+      },
+      "placeholders": {},
+      "env_required": {},
+      "docs_url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/servers/tree/main/src/sequentialthinking",
+      "notes": "Set DISABLE_THOUGHT_LOGGING=true to stop it from printing each thought step to the console.",
+      "last_release": "2026-07-04"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "git",
+      "display": "Git",
+      "description": "Lets Claude read history, diff, branch, and search a local git repository.",
+      "category": "dev",
+      "homepage": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/servers/tree/main/src/git",
+      "stars": 85995,
+      "official": true,
+      "setup": "basic",
+      "config": {
+        "command": "uvx",
+        "args": [
+          "mcp-server-git@2026.7.10",
+          "--repository",
+          "<REPO_PATH>"
+        ]
+      },
+      "placeholders": {
+        "<REPO_PATH>": "Absolute path to the local git repository"
+      },
+      "env_required": {},
+      "docs_url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/servers/tree/main/src/git",
+      "notes": "Operates on a local checkout only; it does not talk to GitHub/GitLab APIs (pair with the GitHub or GitLab server for that).",
+      "last_release": "2026-07-10"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "github",
+      "display": "GitHub",
+      "description": "Lets Claude read repos/code, and manage issues, pull requests, and Actions on GitHub.",
+      "category": "code-hosting",
+      "homepage": "https://github.com/github/github-mcp-server",
+      "stars": 30202,
+      "official": true,
+      "setup": "basic",
+      "config": {
+        "command": "docker",
+        "args": [
+          "run",
+          "-i",
+          "--rm",
+          "-e",
+          "GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN",
+          "ghcr.io/github/github-mcp-server:v1.0.1"
+        ]
+      },
+      "placeholders": {},
+      "env_required": {
+        "GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN": ""
+      },
+      "docs_url": "https://github.com/github/github-mcp-server/blob/main/docs/installation-guides/README.md",
+      "notes": "The old '@modelcontextprotocol/server-github' npm package is discontinued (deprecated April 2025). GitHub now ships a Docker-based local server (requires Docker installed/running) plus a hosted remote server at https://api.githubcopilot.com/mcp/ that supports OAuth or PAT auth without Docker."
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "playwright",
+      "display": "Playwright",
+      "description": "Lets Claude drive a real browser (click, type, navigate, screenshot) using Playwright's accessibility-tree snapshots.",
+      "category": "browser",
+      "homepage": "https://github.com/microsoft/playwright-mcp",
+      "stars": 34000,
+      "official": true,
+      "setup": "basic",
+      "config": {
+        "command": "npx",
+        "args": [
+          "@playwright/mcp@0.0.78"
+        ]
+      },
+      "placeholders": {},
+      "env_required": {},
+      "docs_url": "https://github.com/microsoft/playwright-mcp#readme",
+      "notes": "Maintained by the Playwright team at Microsoft. Add '--isolated' for a throwaway profile, or '--browser firefox|webkit|msedge' to change engine. A persistent browser profile is used by default so logins carry over between sessions.",
+      "last_release": "2026-07-09"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "chrome-devtools",
+      "display": "Chrome DevTools",
+      "description": "Lets Claude control Chrome and use real DevTools features: performance traces, network inspection, console logs, screenshots.",
+      "category": "browser",
+      "homepage": "https://github.com/ChromeDevTools/chrome-devtools-mcp",
+      "stars": 45000,
+      "official": true,
+      "setup": "basic",
+      "config": {
+        "command": "npx",
+        "args": [
+          "-y",
+          "chrome-devtools-mcp@1.5.0"
+        ]
+      },
+      "placeholders": {},
+      "env_required": {},
+      "docs_url": "https://github.com/ChromeDevTools/chrome-devtools-mcp#readme",
+      "notes": "Maintained by the Google Chrome DevTools team; only officially supports Google Chrome / Chrome for Testing. Exposes the browser's content to the MCP client, so avoid sensitive sites while connected. Add '--slim --headless' for a minimal 3-tool basic-automation mode.",
+      "last_release": "2026-07-03"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "postgres",
+      "display": "Postgres MCP Pro",
+      "description": "Lets Claude query, inspect schema, and analyze/tune performance of a PostgreSQL database.",
+      "category": "database",
+      "homepage": "https://github.com/crystaldba/postgres-mcp",
+      "stars": 2400,
+      "official": false,
+      "setup": "basic",
+      "config": {
+        "command": "uvx",
+        "args": [
+          "postgres-mcp@0.3.0",
+          "--access-mode=restricted"
+        ]
+      },
+      "placeholders": {},
+      "env_required": {
+        "DATABASE_URI": ""
+      },
+      "docs_url": "https://github.com/crystaldba/postgres-mcp#readme",
+      "notes": "The official reference Postgres server was archived by the MCP team; this community server (Crystal DBA) is the most capable/most-referenced replacement, adding index tuning and EXPLAIN-plan analysis. Use --access-mode=restricted for read-only/production use. Docker image also available (crystaldba/postgres-mcp). Catalog ships --access-mode=restricted (read-only); switch to unrestricted yourself if you want writes.",
+      "last_release": "2025-05-16"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "n8n",
+      "display": "n8n",
+      "description": "Build, validate, and deploy n8n workflows with full node documentation for the AI.",
+      "category": "infra",
+      "homepage": "https://github.com/czlonkowski/n8n-mcp",
+      "stars": 22257,
+      "official": false,
+      "setup": "basic",
+      "config": {
+        "command": "npx",
+        "args": [
+          "n8n-mcp@2.63.2"
+        ]
+      },
+      "placeholders": {},
+      "env_required": {
+        "MCP_MODE": "",
+        "N8N_API_URL": "",
+        "N8N_API_KEY": ""
+      },
+      "docs_url": "https://github.com/czlonkowski/n8n-mcp",
+      "notes": "Set MCP_MODE=stdio (required for Claude Desktop, prevents debug logs from breaking the protocol). N8N_API_URL/N8N_API_KEY are optional — without them you still get full node documentation, validation, and template search; with them you get live workflow create/update/execute against your own n8n instance. A hosted free-tier alternative exists at dashboard.n8n-mcp.com.",
+      "last_release": "2026-07-09"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "notion",
+      "display": "Notion",
+      "description": "Read, search, and edit Notion pages, databases, and comments from your AI assistant.",
+      "category": "productivity",
+      "homepage": "https://github.com/makenotion/notion-mcp-server",
+      "stars": 4400,
+      "official": true,
+      "setup": "basic",
+      "config": {
+        "command": "npx",
+        "args": [
+          "-y",
+          "@notionhq/notion-mcp-server@2.4.1"
+        ]
+      },
+      "placeholders": {},
+      "env_required": {
+        "NOTION_TOKEN": ""
+      },
+      "docs_url": "https://developers.notion.com/docs/mcp",
+      "notes": "Notion is prioritizing its hosted remote MCP (OAuth, https://mcp.notion.com/mcp) and may eventually sunset this local package, but the stdio server still works today and is the simplest way to get a static config with an internal-integration token.",
+      "last_release": "2026-06-22"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "obsidian",
+      "display": "Obsidian",
+      "description": "Read, search, and edit notes in your Obsidian vault.",
+      "category": "personal",
+      "homepage": "https://github.com/MarkusPfundstein/mcp-obsidian",
+      "stars": 4067,
+      "official": false,
+      "setup": "basic",
+      "config": {
+        "command": "uvx",
+        "args": [
+          "mcp-obsidian@0.2.2"
+        ]
+      },
+      "placeholders": {},
+      "env_required": {
+        "OBSIDIAN_API_KEY": "",
+        "OBSIDIAN_HOST": "",
+        "OBSIDIAN_PORT": ""
+      },
+      "docs_url": "https://github.com/MarkusPfundstein/mcp-obsidian",
+      "notes": "Requires the Obsidian Local REST API community plugin installed and enabled in Obsidian; copy the API key from the plugin settings. OBSIDIAN_HOST defaults to 127.0.0.1 and OBSIDIAN_PORT to 27124 if omitted.",
+      "last_release": "2025-04-01"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "brave-search",
+      "display": "Brave Search",
+      "description": "Search the web, news, images, and videos using Brave's independent search index.",
+      "category": "search",
+      "homepage": "https://github.com/brave/brave-search-mcp-server",
+      "stars": 1288,
+      "official": true,
+      "setup": "basic",
+      "config": {
+        "command": "npx",
+        "args": [
+          "-y",
+          "@brave/brave-search-mcp-server@2.0.85",
+          "--transport",
+          "stdio"
+        ]
+      },
+      "placeholders": {},
+      "env_required": {
+        "BRAVE_API_KEY": ""
+      },
+      "docs_url": "https://github.com/brave/brave-search-mcp-server",
+      "notes": "Official Brave server; replaced the old archived modelcontextprotocol/servers brave-search entry (now in modelcontextprotocol/servers-archived). Get an API key from the Brave Search API dashboard.",
+      "last_release": "2026-06-15"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "tavily",
+      "display": "Tavily",
+      "description": "AI-optimized web search, extract, map, and crawl API built for LLM agents.",
+      "category": "search",
+      "homepage": "https://github.com/tavily-ai/tavily-mcp",
+      "stars": 2206,
+      "official": true,
+      "setup": "basic",
+      "config": {
+        "command": "npx",
+        "args": [
+          "tavily-mcp@0.2.21"
+        ]
+      },
+      "placeholders": {},
+      "env_required": {
+        "TAVILY_API_KEY": ""
+      },
+      "docs_url": "https://github.com/tavily-ai/tavily-mcp",
+      "notes": "Tavily also offers a hosted remote MCP endpoint (mcp.tavily.com) with OAuth as an alternative to running the local npx server.",
+      "last_release": "2026-07-10"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "home-assistant",
+      "display": "Home Assistant",
+      "description": "Control smart home devices, query states, and troubleshoot automations in Home Assistant.",
+      "category": "smart-home",
+      "homepage": "https://github.com/voska/hass-mcp",
+      "stars": 308,
+      "official": false,
+      "setup": "basic",
+      "config": {
+        "command": "docker",
+        "args": [
+          "run",
+          "-i",
+          "--rm",
+          "-e",
+          "HA_URL",
+          "-e",
+          "HA_TOKEN",
+          "voska/hass-mcp:0.5.0"
+        ]
+      },
+      "placeholders": {},
+      "env_required": {
+        "HA_URL": "",
+        "HA_TOKEN": ""
+      },
+      "docs_url": "https://github.com/voska/hass-mcp",
+      "notes": "HA_URL example: http://homeassistant.local:8123 (use http://host.docker.internal:8123 if HA runs in Docker on the same machine). HA_TOKEN is a Home Assistant long-lived access token from your profile page. A more actively developed alternative is the community 'HA-MCP' integration (homeassistant-ai/ha-mcp, ~3.9k stars), but it installs inside Home Assistant itself via HACS rather than as an external stdio process, so it doesn't fit this catalog's launch-line format."
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "kubernetes",
+      "display": "Kubernetes",
+      "description": "Lets Claude inspect and manage Kubernetes/OpenShift resources — pods, deployments, logs, Helm releases — using your local kubeconfig.",
+      "category": "infra",
+      "homepage": "https://github.com/containers/kubernetes-mcp-server",
+      "stars": 1626,
+      "official": false,
+      "setup": "basic",
+      "config": {
+        "command": "npx",
+        "args": [
+          "-y",
+          "kubernetes-mcp-server@0.0.64"
+        ]
+      },
+      "placeholders": {},
+      "env_required": {},
+      "docs_url": "https://github.com/containers/kubernetes-mcp-server#readme",
+      "notes": "Not an official Kubernetes SIG project, but a Go-native (no kubectl dependency) implementation maintained under the 'containers' GitHub org (Podman/Red Hat-adjacent) that's widely regarded as the most capable K8s MCP server, supporting Kubernetes and OpenShift. Uses your existing ~/.kube/config automatically; add --read-only to prevent writes.",
+      "last_release": "2026-07-10"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "aws-api-mcp-server",
+      "display": "AWS API MCP Server (AWS Labs)",
+      "description": "Lets your AI assistant run AWS CLI commands to inspect and manage AWS resources across virtually every AWS service.",
+      "category": "cloud",
+      "homepage": "https://github.com/awslabs/mcp",
+      "stars": 9431,
+      "official": true,
+      "setup": "basic",
+      "config": {
+        "command": "uvx",
+        "args": [
+          "awslabs.aws-api-mcp-server@1.3.46"
+        ]
+      },
+      "placeholders": {},
+      "env_required": {},
+      "docs_url": "https://awslabs.github.io/mcp/servers/aws-api-mcp-server",
+      "notes": "AWS credentials are NOT set in this MCP config — configure them beforehand via `aws configure` (or set AWS_API_MCP_PROFILE_NAME to pick a named profile) so boto3's standard credential chain can find them. Optional env vars: AWS_REGION (default us-east-1), READ_OPERATIONS_ONLY=true to block all mutating AWS calls. AWS notes this server is being superseded by a newer unified AWS MCP server referenced in their agent-toolkit docs.",
+      "last_release": "2026-06-25"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "grafana",
+      "display": "Grafana",
+      "description": "Query dashboards, datasources, alerts and incidents in Grafana from your AI assistant.",
+      "category": "observability",
+      "homepage": "https://github.com/grafana/mcp-grafana",
+      "stars": 3227,
+      "official": true,
+      "setup": "basic",
+      "config": {
+        "command": "uvx",
+        "args": [
+          "mcp-grafana@0.17.1"
+        ],
+        "env": {
+          "GRAFANA_URL": "<GRAFANA_URL>"
+        }
+      },
+      "placeholders": {
+        "<GRAFANA_URL>": "Your Grafana instance URL, e.g. http://localhost:3000 or https://yourstack.grafana.net"
+      },
+      "env_required": {
+        "GRAFANA_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN": ""
+      },
+      "docs_url": "https://grafana.com/docs/grafana/latest/developer-resources/mcp/",
+      "notes": "Requires Grafana 9.0+ for full functionality — datasource-related tools may not work correctly on older versions.",
+      "last_release": "2026-07-07"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "slack",
+      "display": "Slack",
+      "description": "Search Slack messages, files, and members, and send messages or manage channels from your AI assistant.",
+      "category": "communication",
+      "homepage": "https://slack.com/help/articles/48855576908307-Guide-to-the-Slack-MCP-server",
+      "stars": null,
+      "official": true,
+      "setup": "link-only",
+      "env_required": {},
+      "docs_url": "https://docs.slack.dev/changelog/2026/02/17/slack-mcp/",
+      "notes": "Slack's own MCP server went GA Feb 17, 2026 (streamable HTTP at https://mcp.slack.com/mcp, OAuth). No stdio one-liner is published because it's a hosted, permissioned connector. A well-known community alternative, korotovsky/slack-mcp-server (~1.6k GitHub stars, MIT, not an official Slack product), supports stdio/SSE/HTTP with bot or browser-session tokens and no app-install requirement if a stdio option is preferred."
+    }
+  ]
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+ы<8¶ђt2ішл„»‰/НЕ0Тjcw&`
+тrH«MўК›єrBL,0AS€!Х2–иже.SТ°ч–'Agm
@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
 [project]
 name = "better-claude-config"
-version = "1.1.0"
+version = "1.3.0"
 description = "Cross-platform GUI for editing the mcpServers block of Claude Desktop and Claude Code configs"
 readme = "README.md"
 license = { file = "LICENSE" }
 requires-python = ">=3.10"
 dependencies = [
    "PySide6>=6.6",
+    "cryptography>=42.0",
 ]

 [project.optional-dependencies]
@@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ pillow>=10.0        # generates icons/app.ico during CI (Windows build)
 # Test / lint
 pytest>=8.0
 ruff>=0.6
+cryptography>=42.0   # release checksum signing (scripts/sign_checksums.py)
@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+Generate a SHA256SUMS file for release artifacts and sign it with Ed25519.
+
+BCC ships PyInstaller binaries that are not code-signed (no budget for a
+macOS Developer ID / Windows Authenticode certificate). This script provides
+the free half of supply-chain integrity: a checksum manifest, detached-signed
+so downloaders can verify the file they got is the file we published.
+
+This does NOT remove Gatekeeper/SmartScreen warnings and does NOT prove the
+binary is safe to run -- only that it matches what the release signing key
+attested to.
+
+Usage:
+    # Hash every file in a directory into a SHA256SUMS-format manifest.
+    python scripts/sign_checksums.py generate <dir> --out SHA256SUMS
+
+    # Sign a manifest, producing a detached signature.
+    # Private key comes from $RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY (base64 raw Ed25519 seed)
+    # unless --key-b64 is given explicitly (mostly for tests).
+    python scripts/sign_checksums.py sign --sums SHA256SUMS --out SHA256SUMS.sig
+
+    # Verify a manifest against a detached signature and a public key.
+    python scripts/sign_checksums.py verify --sums SHA256SUMS --sig SHA256SUMS.sig \
+        --pubkey-b64 <base64 raw Ed25519 public key>
+
+The private key is generated and rotated via the Catalog Console (#62) --
+this script never generates or stores a key itself.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import os
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+# Domain separation prefix: ties every signature to "a BCC release checksum
+# manifest" so a signature can never be replayed against an unrelated
+# message signed by the same key.
+DOMAIN_PREFIX = b"bcc-release-v1|"
+
+# Public half of the RELEASE signing key(s) -- a SEPARATE keypair from
+# bcc_core.CATALOG_PUBKEYS (issue #68 finding 5). The catalog key is the
+# offline, Console-only root of trust for what BCC executes; this key is
+# CI-resident and signs ONLY the release SHA256SUMS manifest, never the
+# catalog. Keeping them apart means a CI/repo-secret compromise burns the
+# release key -- annoying, but it never lets an attacker sign a catalog a
+# user's binary would trust. A LIST (not a single key), mirroring
+# CATALOG_PUBKEYS, so the release key can be rotated without invalidating
+# the signature on every past release: verification accepts a match against
+# ANY key here.
+#
+# Empty until the maintainer generates the release keypair (separately from
+# the catalog keypair) and pastes the public half in:
+#     python catalog_console.py keygen --release
+# This is intentionally NOT pre-populated with a placeholder that looks
+# like a real key -- release.yml's signing-smoke-test fails closed (loudly)
+# on an empty list rather than silently verifying against nothing.
+RELEASE_PUBKEYS: list[bytes] = []
+
+CHUNK_SIZE = 1024 * 1024
+
+
+def sha256_file(path: Path) -> str:
+    """Return the lowercase hex SHA-256 digest of a file's contents."""
+    digest = hashlib.sha256()
+    with open(path, "rb") as fh:
+        while chunk := fh.read(CHUNK_SIZE):
+            digest.update(chunk)
+    return digest.hexdigest()
+
+
+def build_checksums_text(files: dict[str, str]) -> str:
+    """Build a sha256sum(1)-compatible manifest body.
+
+    `files` maps filename -> hex digest. Entries are sorted by filename for
+    a deterministic, diffable output. Format matches `sha256sum` exactly:
+    "<hash>  <filename>\n" (two spaces, no path components).
+    """
+    lines = [f"{digest}  {name}" for name, digest in sorted(files.items())]
+    body = "\n".join(lines)
+    return body + "\n" if body else ""
+
+
+def generate_checksums(directory: Path, *, exclude: set[str] | None = None) -> str:
+    """Hash every regular file directly inside `directory` (non-recursive)
+    and return the SHA256SUMS text. Filenames are recorded without any
+    directory prefix so the manifest can be verified from inside the
+    directory it describes.
+    """
+    exclude = exclude or set()
+    files: dict[str, str] = {}
+    for entry in sorted(directory.iterdir()):
+        if not entry.is_file():
+            continue
+        if entry.name in exclude:
+            continue
+        files[entry.name] = sha256_file(entry)
+    return build_checksums_text(files)
+
+
+def _signing_message(sums_text: str) -> bytes:
+    """The exact bytes that get signed: the domain prefix followed by the
+    raw bytes of the SHA256SUMS file content."""
+    return DOMAIN_PREFIX + sums_text.encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def sign_checksums(seed_b64: str, sums_text: str) -> bytes:
+    """Sign `sums_text` with the Ed25519 private key encoded (base64, raw
+    32-byte seed) in `seed_b64`. Returns the raw 64-byte signature."""
+    # Imported lazily so `generate` mode (used on every CI run) never
+    # requires the `cryptography` package to be installed.
+    from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
+
+    seed = base64.b64decode(seed_b64)
+    if len(seed) != 32:
+        raise ValueError(f"expected a 32-byte raw Ed25519 seed, got {len(seed)} bytes")
+    private_key = Ed25519PrivateKey.from_private_bytes(seed)
+    return private_key.sign(_signing_message(sums_text))
+
+
+def verify_checksums(pubkey_b64: str, sums_text: str, signature: bytes) -> bool:
+    """Verify `signature` over `sums_text` against the base64-encoded raw
+    32-byte Ed25519 public key. Returns True/False; never raises for a bad
+    signature (only for malformed inputs)."""
+    from cryptography.exceptions import InvalidSignature
+    from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PublicKey
+
+    pubkey_bytes = base64.b64decode(pubkey_b64)
+    if len(pubkey_bytes) != 32:
+        raise ValueError(
+            f"expected a 32-byte raw Ed25519 public key, got {len(pubkey_bytes)} bytes"
+        )
+    public_key = Ed25519PublicKey.from_public_bytes(pubkey_bytes)
+    try:
+        public_key.verify(signature, _signing_message(sums_text))
+        return True
+    except InvalidSignature:
+        return False
+
+
+def public_key_b64_from_seed(seed_b64: str) -> str:
+    """Derive the base64 raw public key from a base64 raw seed. Handy for
+    local key-pair sanity checks; not used by the release workflow."""
+    from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
+    from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import Encoding, PublicFormat
+
+    seed = base64.b64decode(seed_b64)
+    private_key = Ed25519PrivateKey.from_private_bytes(seed)
+    raw = private_key.public_key().public_bytes(Encoding.Raw, PublicFormat.Raw)
+    return base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii")
+
+
+def verify_checksums_against_any(pubkeys: list[bytes], sums_text: str, signature: bytes) -> bool:
+    """Verify `signature` against ANY key in `pubkeys` (each a raw 32-byte
+    Ed25519 public key). Mirrors bcc_core.verify_catalog_signature's
+    rotation-friendly "any currently-trusted key" semantics, applied to
+    RELEASE_PUBKEYS instead of the catalog's key list. Returns False (never
+    raises) for an empty `pubkeys` list -- fails closed rather than
+    vacuously verifying against nothing."""
+    return any(
+        verify_checksums(base64.b64encode(pk).decode("ascii"), sums_text, signature)
+        for pk in pubkeys
+    )
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# CLI
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+def _cmd_generate(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
+    directory = Path(args.directory)
+    exclude = {"SHA256SUMS", "SHA256SUMS.sig"}
+    text = generate_checksums(directory, exclude=exclude)
+    out_path = Path(args.out)
+    out_path.write_text(text, encoding="utf-8")
+    print(f"Wrote {out_path} ({len(text.splitlines())} entries)")
+    return 0
+
+
+def _cmd_sign(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
+    seed_b64 = args.key_b64 or os.environ.get(args.key_env, "")
+    if not seed_b64:
+        print(
+            f"error: no signing key provided (checked --key-b64 and ${args.key_env})",
+            file=sys.stderr,
+        )
+        return 1
+    sums_text = Path(args.sums).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    signature = sign_checksums(seed_b64, sums_text)
+    Path(args.out).write_bytes(signature)
+    print(f"Wrote {args.out} ({len(signature)} bytes)")
+    return 0
+
+
+def _cmd_verify(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
+    pubkey_b64 = args.pubkey_b64 or os.environ.get(args.pubkey_env, "")
+    if not pubkey_b64:
+        print(
+            f"error: no public key provided (checked --pubkey-b64 and ${args.pubkey_env})",
+            file=sys.stderr,
+        )
+        return 1
+    sums_text = Path(args.sums).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    signature = Path(args.sig).read_bytes()
+    ok = verify_checksums(pubkey_b64, sums_text, signature)
+    if ok:
+        print("OK: signature is valid")
+        return 0
+    print("FAILED: signature is invalid", file=sys.stderr)
+    return 1
+
+
+def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
+        description=__doc__, formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter
+    )
+    sub = parser.add_subparsers(dest="mode", required=True)
+
+    p_gen = sub.add_parser(
+        "generate", help="hash every file in a directory into a SHA256SUMS manifest"
+    )
+    p_gen.add_argument("directory", help="directory whose files should be hashed (non-recursive)")
+    p_gen.add_argument("--out", required=True, help="path to write the SHA256SUMS manifest to")
+    p_gen.set_defaults(func=_cmd_generate)
+
+    p_sign = sub.add_parser("sign", help="detached-sign a SHA256SUMS manifest with Ed25519")
+    p_sign.add_argument("--sums", required=True, help="path to the SHA256SUMS manifest to sign")
+    p_sign.add_argument("--out", required=True, help="path to write the detached signature to")
+    p_sign.add_argument(
+        "--key-b64", default=None, help="base64 raw Ed25519 seed (overrides --key-env)"
+    )
+    p_sign.add_argument(
+        "--key-env",
+        default="RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY",
+        help="environment variable holding the base64 seed (default: RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY)",
+    )
+    p_sign.set_defaults(func=_cmd_sign)
+
+    p_verify = sub.add_parser(
+        "verify", help="verify a SHA256SUMS manifest against a detached signature"
+    )
+    p_verify.add_argument("--sums", required=True, help="path to the SHA256SUMS manifest")
+    p_verify.add_argument("--sig", required=True, help="path to the detached signature")
+    p_verify.add_argument(
+        "--pubkey-b64", default=None, help="base64 raw Ed25519 public key (overrides --pubkey-env)"
+    )
+    p_verify.add_argument(
+        "--pubkey-env",
+        default="RELEASE_SIGNING_PUBKEY",
+        help="environment variable holding the base64 public key (default: RELEASE_SIGNING_PUBKEY)",
+    )
+    p_verify.set_defaults(func=_cmd_verify)
+
+    return parser
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    parser = build_parser()
+    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
+    return args.func(args)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+"""Asserts the maintainer-only Catalog Console (catalog_console.py,
+catalog_review.py) is never bundled into the release binary.
+
+A signing/review tool shipping to end users would be an own-goal (issue
+#62): it has no reason to run on a user's machine, and its presence would
+be a confusing artefact of a build that's supposed to be a thin GUI over
+mcpServers config editing."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
+SPEC_PATH = REPO_ROOT / "bcc.spec"
+
+_EXCLUDED_FILES = ("catalog_console.py", "catalog_review.py")
+
+
+def test_spec_file_exists():
+    assert SPEC_PATH.exists()
+
+
+def test_console_files_not_named_in_spec():
+    """The spec text must never reference either maintainer-only module --
+    not as the Analysis entry point, not in datas, not anywhere."""
+    spec_text = SPEC_PATH.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    for filename in _EXCLUDED_FILES:
+        assert filename not in spec_text, (
+            f"{filename} must never be referenced by bcc.spec -- it is a "
+            "maintainer-only tool and must not ship to users."
+        )
+
+
+def test_spec_analysis_entry_point_is_bcc_py_only():
+    """PyInstaller's Analysis(...) call determines the dependency-scanned
+    entry point(s); it must be bcc.py alone."""
+    spec_text = SPEC_PATH.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert 'Analysis(\n    ["bcc.py"],' in spec_text or 'Analysis(["bcc.py"]' in spec_text, (
+        "bcc.spec's Analysis(...) entry point changed shape -- re-verify by hand "
+        "that catalog_console.py / catalog_review.py are still excluded."
+    )
+
+
+def test_console_modules_exist_but_are_standalone_top_level_files():
+    """Sanity check the files this test is guarding actually exist as
+    top-level modules (not, say, silently moved into a package PyInstaller's
+    Analysis would still pick up as an implicit import of bcc.py)."""
+    for filename in _EXCLUDED_FILES:
+        assert (REPO_ROOT / filename).exists()
+        # bcc.py must not import them.
+        bcc_text = (REPO_ROOT / "bcc.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+        module_name = filename.removesuffix(".py")
+        assert f"import {module_name}" not in bcc_text
+        assert f"from {module_name}" not in bcc_text
+
+
+def test_requirements_files_do_not_reference_console_only_needs():
+    """catalog_console.py's only import beyond the shipped stack is the
+    optional `keyring` package, which is intentionally NOT added as a hard
+    dependency anywhere a user install would pick it up."""
+    for req_file in ("requirements.txt", "requirements-dev.txt"):
+        path = REPO_ROOT / req_file
+        if not path.exists():
+            continue
+        text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").lower()
+        assert "keyring" not in text
@@ -0,0 +1,695 @@
+"""Tests for catalog_review.py -- semantic diff, risk predicates, review
+session (acknowledge-gating + TOCTOU blob pinning), key encryption, and
+registry-lookup logic for the Catalog Console (issue #62)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+import bcc_core as c
+import catalog_review as r
+
+
+def _entry(**overrides):
+    base = {
+        "id": "filesystem",
+        "display": "Filesystem",
+        "description": "desc",
+        "category": "files",
+        "homepage": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/servers",
+        "stars": 100,
+        "official": True,
+        "setup": "basic",
+        "config": {
+            "command": "npx",
+            "args": ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem@1.0.0"],
+        },
+        "env_required": {},
+        "docs_url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/servers",
+        "notes": "",
+        "last_release": "2026-01-01",
+    }
+    base.update(overrides)
+    return base
+
+
+def _catalog(*entries):
+    return {"schema": 1, "version": 1, "servers": list(entries)}
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# diff_catalogs
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+def test_diff_detects_added_entry():
+    old = _catalog()
+    new = _catalog(_entry())
+    changes = r.diff_catalogs(old, new)
+    assert len(changes) == 1
+    assert changes[0].status == "added"
+    assert changes[0].entry_id == "filesystem"
+    assert changes[0].old is None
+
+
+def test_diff_detects_removed_entry():
+    old = _catalog(_entry())
+    new = _catalog()
+    changes = r.diff_catalogs(old, new)
+    assert len(changes) == 1
+    assert changes[0].status == "removed"
+    assert changes[0].new is None
+
+
+def test_diff_detects_no_change():
+    e = _entry()
+    old = _catalog(e)
+    new = _catalog(dict(e))
+    assert r.diff_catalogs(old, new) == []
+
+
+def test_diff_detects_changed_command_and_args():
+    old = _catalog(_entry())
+    new = _catalog(_entry(config={"command": "uvx", "args": ["other-pkg@2.0.0"]}))
+    changes = r.diff_catalogs(old, new)
+    assert len(changes) == 1
+    ch = changes[0]
+    assert ch.status == "changed"
+    fields = {fc.field for fc in ch.field_changes}
+    assert "config.command" in fields
+    assert "config.args" in fields
+
+
+def test_diff_detects_description_change():
+    old = _catalog(_entry())
+    new = _catalog(_entry(description="new description"))
+    changes = r.diff_catalogs(old, new)
+    assert changes[0].field_changes == (r.FieldChange("description", "desc", "new description"),)
+
+
+def test_diff_ignores_entries_without_id():
+    old = _catalog()
+    new = _catalog({"display": "no id"})
+    assert r.diff_catalogs(old, new) == []
+
+
+def test_diff_multiple_entries_sorted_by_id():
+    old = _catalog(_entry(id="zeta"), _entry(id="alpha"))
+    new = _catalog(
+        _entry(id="zeta", description="changed"), _entry(id="alpha", description="changed")
+    )
+    changes = r.diff_catalogs(old, new)
+    assert [c_.entry_id for c_ in changes] == ["alpha", "zeta"]
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# risk_env_required
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+def test_risk_env_required_blocking_on_nonempty_value():
+    change = r.EntryChange("x", "changed", None, _entry(env_required={"API_KEY": "sk-real-value"}))
+    findings = r.risk_env_required(change)
+    assert len(findings) == 1
+    assert findings[0].severity == "blocking"
+    assert findings[0].code == "env_required_value"
+
+
+def test_risk_env_required_clean_on_empty_value():
+    change = r.EntryChange("x", "changed", None, _entry(env_required={"API_KEY": ""}))
+    assert r.risk_env_required(change) == []
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# risk_command_allowlist
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+def test_risk_command_allowlist_blocks_disallowed_command():
+    change = r.EntryChange(
+        "x", "changed", None, _entry(config={"command": "bash", "args": ["-c", "evil"]})
+    )
+    findings = r.risk_command_allowlist(change)
+    assert len(findings) == 1
+    assert findings[0].severity == "blocking"
+
+
+def test_risk_command_allowlist_allows_listed_command():
+    for cmd in sorted(c.CATALOG_ALLOWED_COMMANDS):
+        change = r.EntryChange("x", "changed", None, _entry(config={"command": cmd, "args": []}))
+        assert r.risk_command_allowlist(change) == []
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# risk_non_ascii
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+def test_risk_non_ascii_flags_homoglyph_id():
+    # Cyrillic 'а' (U+0430) instead of Latin 'a' -- classic homoglyph swap.
+    evil_id = "filаsystem"
+    change = r.EntryChange(evil_id, "changed", None, _entry(id=evil_id))
+    findings = r.risk_non_ascii(change)
+    assert any(f.code == "non_ascii_id" for f in findings)
+    assert findings[0].severity == "blocking"
+    # the offending string must be rendered with escapes, not raw
+    assert "\\u0430" in findings[0].message
+
+
+def test_risk_non_ascii_flags_arg():
+    change = r.EntryChange(
+        "x", "changed", None, _entry(config={"command": "npx", "args": ["pаckage@1.0.0"]})
+    )
+    findings = r.risk_non_ascii(change)
+    assert any(f.code == "non_ascii_arg" for f in findings)
+
+
+def test_risk_non_ascii_clean_for_ascii_entry():
+    change = r.EntryChange("x", "changed", None, _entry())
+    assert r.risk_non_ascii(change) == []
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# risk_unpinned_package
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+def test_risk_unpinned_npm_package_no_version():
+    change = r.EntryChange(
+        "x",
+        "changed",
+        None,
+        _entry(config={"command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "@scope/pkg"]}),
+    )
+    findings = r.risk_unpinned_package(change)
+    assert len(findings) == 1
+    assert findings[0].code == "unpinned_npm_package"
+    assert findings[0].severity == "blocking"
+
+
+def test_risk_pinned_npm_package_is_clean():
+    change = r.EntryChange(
+        "x",
+        "changed",
+        None,
+        _entry(config={"command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "@scope/pkg@1.2.3"]}),
+    )
+    assert r.risk_unpinned_package(change) == []
+
+
+def test_risk_unpinned_unscoped_npm_package():
+    change = r.EntryChange(
+        "x", "changed", None, _entry(config={"command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "somepkg"]})
+    )
+    findings = r.risk_unpinned_package(change)
+    assert len(findings) == 1
+
+
+def test_risk_unpinned_docker_latest_tag():
+    change = r.EntryChange(
+        "x",
+        "changed",
+        None,
+        _entry(config={"command": "docker", "args": ["run", "-i", "--rm", "myimage:latest"]}),
+    )
+    findings = r.risk_unpinned_package(change)
+    assert len(findings) == 1
+    assert findings[0].code == "unpinned_docker_image"
+
+
+def test_risk_unpinned_docker_no_tag():
+    change = r.EntryChange(
+        "x", "changed", None, _entry(config={"command": "docker", "args": ["run", "myimage"]})
+    )
+    findings = r.risk_unpinned_package(change)
+    assert len(findings) == 1
+
+
+def test_risk_pinned_docker_image_is_clean():
+    change = r.EntryChange(
+        "x",
+        "changed",
+        None,
+        _entry(config={"command": "docker", "args": ["run", "-i", "--rm", "myimage:1.2.3"]}),
+    )
+    assert r.risk_unpinned_package(change) == []
+
+
+def test_risk_docker_digest_pin_is_clean():
+    change = r.EntryChange(
+        "x",
+        "changed",
+        None,
+        _entry(
+            config={
+                "command": "docker",
+                "args": ["run", "myimage@sha256:" + "a" * 64],
+            }
+        ),
+    )
+    assert r.risk_unpinned_package(change) == []
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# risk_url_domain_change
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+def test_risk_url_domain_change_warns_on_lookalike_swap():
+    old_entry = _entry(homepage="https://github.com/foo/bar")
+    new_entry = _entry(homepage="https://githu6.com/foo/bar")
+    change = r.EntryChange("x", "changed", old_entry, new_entry)
+    findings = r.risk_url_domain_change(change)
+    assert any(f.code == "domain_changed" for f in findings)
+    domain_finding = next(f for f in findings if f.code == "domain_changed")
+    assert "github.com" in domain_finding.message
+    assert "githu6.com" in domain_finding.message
+    assert domain_finding.severity == "warning"
+
+
+def test_risk_url_domain_change_clean_when_domain_unchanged():
+    old_entry = _entry(homepage="https://github.com/foo/bar")
+    new_entry = _entry(homepage="https://github.com/foo/bar-renamed")
+    change = r.EntryChange("x", "changed", old_entry, new_entry)
+    assert r.risk_url_domain_change(change) == []
+
+
+def test_risk_url_non_https_warns():
+    new_entry = _entry(homepage="http://example.com")
+    change = r.EntryChange("x", "changed", None, new_entry)
+    findings = r.risk_url_domain_change(change)
+    assert any(f.code == "non_https_url" for f in findings)
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# risk_new_entry / entry_risk_findings / has_blocking_risk
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+def test_risk_new_entry_flags_added():
+    change = r.EntryChange("x", "added", None, _entry())
+    findings = r.risk_new_entry(change)
+    assert len(findings) == 1
+    assert findings[0].severity == "info"
+
+
+def test_risk_new_entry_silent_for_changed():
+    change = r.EntryChange("x", "changed", _entry(), _entry(description="x"))
+    assert r.risk_new_entry(change) == []
+
+
+def test_has_blocking_risk_true_for_disallowed_command():
+    change = r.EntryChange("x", "changed", None, _entry(config={"command": "bash", "args": []}))
+    assert r.has_blocking_risk(change) is True
+
+
+def test_has_blocking_risk_false_for_clean_entry():
+    change = r.EntryChange("x", "changed", _entry(), _entry(description="new"))
+    assert r.has_blocking_risk(change) is False
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# ReviewSession: acknowledge gating
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+def test_start_review_computes_diff():
+    old = _catalog()
+    new = _catalog(_entry())
+    session = r.start_review("sha1", old, new)
+    assert len(session.changes) == 1
+
+
+def test_all_entries_acknowledged_false_initially():
+    session = r.start_review("sha1", _catalog(), _catalog(_entry()))
+    assert r.all_entries_acknowledged(session) is False
+
+
+def test_acknowledge_entry_marks_acknowledged():
+    session = r.start_review("sha1", _catalog(), _catalog(_entry()))
+    r.acknowledge_entry(session, "filesystem")
+    assert r.all_entries_acknowledged(session) is True
+
+
+def test_acknowledge_unknown_entry_raises():
+    session = r.start_review("sha1", _catalog(), _catalog(_entry()))
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+        r.acknowledge_entry(session, "not-in-diff")
+
+
+def test_acknowledge_gating_requires_every_entry():
+    session = r.start_review("sha1", _catalog(), _catalog(_entry(id="a"), _entry(id="b")))
+    r.acknowledge_entry(session, "a")
+    assert r.all_entries_acknowledged(session) is False
+    r.acknowledge_entry(session, "b")
+    assert r.all_entries_acknowledged(session) is True
+
+
+def test_no_acknowledge_all_shortcut_and_gate_is_real():
+    """Two things, both load-bearing (issue #68: the original version of
+    this test asserted ONLY the first half, and passed the entire time the
+    gate below it was vacuously satisfiable -- 'no function named
+    acknowledge_all' is worthless if signing doesn't actually require
+    acknowledgement in practice).
+
+    1. No bulk-acknowledge shortcut exists (see the comment in
+       catalog_review.py above SignDecision -- deliberate friction).
+    2. The gate that friction protects is actually enforced: with entries
+       still unacknowledged, can_sign() must refuse, not just "some GUI
+       checkbox happens to be unticked".
+    """
+    names = [n for n in dir(r) if "acknowledge" in n.lower()]
+    assert "acknowledge_all" not in names
+    assert "acknowledge_all_entries" not in names
+
+    session = r.start_review("sha1", _catalog(), _catalog(_entry(id="a"), _entry(id="b")))
+    r.acknowledge_entry(session, "a")  # only one of two -- not a bulk call
+    decision = r.can_sign(session, "sha1")
+    assert decision.ok is False
+    assert "acknowledged" in decision.reason.lower()
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# can_sign: TOCTOU blob pinning + acknowledge gating combined
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+def test_can_sign_false_when_not_all_acknowledged():
+    session = r.start_review("sha1", _catalog(), _catalog(_entry()))
+    decision = r.can_sign(session, "sha1")
+    assert decision.ok is False
+    assert "acknowledged" in decision.reason
+
+
+def test_can_sign_true_when_acknowledged_and_blob_matches():
+    session = r.start_review("sha1", _catalog(), _catalog(_entry()))
+    r.acknowledge_entry(session, "filesystem")
+    decision = r.can_sign(session, "sha1")
+    assert decision.ok is True
+    assert decision.reason is None
+
+
+def test_can_sign_refuses_on_blob_mismatch_even_if_acknowledged():
+    """The core TOCTOU fix: acknowledging everything is not enough if the
+    bytes on the remote changed underneath the review."""
+    session = r.start_review("sha1", _catalog(), _catalog(_entry()))
+    r.acknowledge_entry(session, "filesystem")
+    decision = r.can_sign(session, "sha2-a-new-commit-landed")
+    assert decision.ok is False
+    assert "changed" in decision.reason.lower() or "mismatch" in decision.reason.lower()
+
+
+def test_can_sign_blob_mismatch_takes_priority_message():
+    session = r.start_review("sha1", _catalog(), _catalog(_entry()))
+    decision = r.can_sign(session, "sha2")
+    assert decision.ok is False
+    assert "blob" in decision.reason.lower() or "changed" in decision.reason.lower()
+
+
+def test_can_sign_false_on_empty_changeset():
+    """The exact bug behind issue #68 finding 1: 'main' loaded against
+    itself diffs to [], and an empty changeset used to leave can_sign()
+    with nothing to refuse on (set() <= set() is vacuously True). Commit
+    b08cf21 signed 19 entries through precisely this path -- zero of them
+    were ever reviewed. An empty diff must mean 'nothing to sign', never
+    'sign unlocked'."""
+    same_catalog = _catalog(_entry())
+    session = r.start_review("sha1", same_catalog, same_catalog)
+    assert session.changes == []  # diff_catalogs(x, x) -> []
+    assert r.all_entries_acknowledged(session) is True  # vacuously -- this is the trap
+    decision = r.can_sign(session, "sha1")  # blob matches, "everything" acknowledged
+    assert decision.ok is False
+    assert "nothing to sign" in decision.reason.lower()
+
+
+def test_can_sign_false_with_outstanding_blocking_risk_even_if_acknowledged():
+    """can_sign() must itself refuse a blocking risk finding -- today a
+    blocking finding only disables the GUI checkbox, so the pure gate must
+    not simply trust that the caller never acknowledged a blocking entry.
+    Acknowledge it directly here (bypassing any GUI checkbox-disable logic
+    entirely) to prove the gate catches it independently of the GUI."""
+    session = r.start_review(
+        "sha1",
+        _catalog(),
+        _catalog(_entry(config={"command": "bash", "args": ["-c", "evil"]})),
+    )
+    r.acknowledge_entry(session, "filesystem")
+    assert r.all_entries_acknowledged(session) is True
+    decision = r.can_sign(session, "sha1")
+    assert decision.ok is False
+    assert "blocking" in decision.reason.lower()
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# sign_precondition: the ref-resolution seam that used to hardcode "main"
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+def test_sign_precondition_resolves_against_loaded_ref_not_hardcoded_main():
+    """The regression test for issue #68 finding 1's first bug:
+    ReviewWindow._on_sign used to hardcode fetch_ref(repo, "main") as the
+    TOCTOU comparison ref. For a PR review, _on_load pins the PR HEAD's
+    blob SHA, so comparing against main's SHA differs by definition and
+    Sign could never fire on the PR path.
+
+    The fake resolver below returns a DIFFERENT (deliberately wrong) SHA for
+    "main" than for the PR ref that was actually loaded. If
+    sign_precondition ever resolves against "main" instead of
+    session.loaded_ref, this test fails -- both via the recorded `calls`
+    list and via decision.ok flipping to False.
+    """
+    pr_ref = "refs/pull/42/head"
+    session = r.start_review("pr-blob-sha", _catalog(), _catalog(_entry()), loaded_ref=pr_ref)
+    r.acknowledge_entry(session, "filesystem")
+
+    calls: list[str] = []
+
+    def fake_resolver(ref: str) -> str:
+        calls.append(ref)
+        return {"main": "main-blob-sha-WRONG", pr_ref: "pr-blob-sha"}[ref]
+
+    decision = r.sign_precondition(session, fake_resolver)
+    assert calls == [pr_ref]  # never asked the resolver for "main"
+    assert decision.ok is True
+    assert decision.reason is None
+
+
+def test_sign_precondition_refuses_when_loaded_ref_blob_moved():
+    """Same seam, the negative case: if the loaded ref's blob SHA has moved
+    since review began (a new commit landed on the reviewed PR/branch), the
+    resolver reflects that and sign_precondition must refuse -- proving this
+    isn't just a hardcoded pass-through."""
+    pr_ref = "refs/pull/42/head"
+    session = r.start_review("pr-blob-sha", _catalog(), _catalog(_entry()), loaded_ref=pr_ref)
+    r.acknowledge_entry(session, "filesystem")
+
+    def fake_resolver(_ref: str) -> str:
+        return "pr-blob-sha-AFTER-A-NEW-PUSH"
+
+    decision = r.sign_precondition(session, fake_resolver)
+    assert decision.ok is False
+    assert "mismatch" in decision.reason.lower() or "changed" in decision.reason.lower()
+
+
+def test_sign_precondition_defaults_to_main_when_loaded_ref_unset():
+    """start_review()'s loaded_ref defaults to 'main' for source=main
+    reviews (and backward-compat with callers that don't pass it)."""
+    session = r.start_review("sha1", _catalog(), _catalog(_entry()))
+    assert session.loaded_ref == "main"
+    r.acknowledge_entry(session, "filesystem")
+
+    def fake_resolver(ref: str) -> str:
+        assert ref == "main"
+        return "sha1"
+
+    decision = r.sign_precondition(session, fake_resolver)
+    assert decision.ok is True
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# find_last_signed_catalog_raw: what source=main diffs against
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+def test_find_last_signed_catalog_raw_returns_matching_candidate():
+    """Simulates walking catalog.json's git history: the CURRENT signature
+    covers an OLDER version of the bytes (a later commit changed
+    catalog.json without re-signing -- the exact bypass that produced
+    commit b08cf21). The first candidate that verifies against that
+    signature is 'the last catalog a maintainer actually signed'."""
+    seed, pubkey = r.generate_keypair()
+    old_raw = b'{"schema":1,"version":1,"servers":[]}'
+    new_raw = b'{"schema":1,"version":2,"servers":[]}'
+    sig = r.sign_catalog_bytes(old_raw, seed)  # signature covers the OLD bytes
+    found = r.find_last_signed_catalog_raw([new_raw, old_raw], sig, [pubkey])
+    assert found == old_raw
+
+
+def test_find_last_signed_catalog_raw_none_when_nothing_verifies():
+    seed, _pubkey = r.generate_keypair()
+    _other_seed, other_pubkey = r.generate_keypair()
+    raw = b'{"schema":1,"version":1,"servers":[]}'
+    sig = r.sign_catalog_bytes(raw, seed)
+    # Check against a pubkey list that does NOT include the signer's key.
+    assert r.find_last_signed_catalog_raw([raw], sig, [other_pubkey]) is None
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# catalog_signing_message: domain separation must match bcc_core exactly
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+def test_signing_message_uses_bcc_core_domain_prefix():
+    raw = b'{"schema":1}'
+    msg = r.catalog_signing_message(raw)
+    assert msg == c._CATALOG_SIG_DOMAIN + raw
+    assert msg.startswith(b"bcc-catalog-v1|")
+
+
+def test_sign_then_verify_round_trips_with_bcc_core():
+    """End-to-end: a signature produced by the Console's sign_catalog_bytes
+    must verify with bcc_core.verify_catalog_signature -- proves the two
+    modules can never drift on the domain-separation prefix."""
+    seed, pubkey = r.generate_keypair()
+    raw = b'{"schema":1,"version":2,"servers":[]}'
+    sig = r.sign_catalog_bytes(raw, seed)
+    assert c.verify_catalog_signature(raw, sig, [pubkey]) is True
+
+
+def test_sign_tampered_bytes_fails_verify():
+    seed, pubkey = r.generate_keypair()
+    raw = b'{"schema":1,"version":2,"servers":[]}'
+    sig = r.sign_catalog_bytes(raw, seed)
+    tampered = raw[:-1] + b"0"
+    assert c.verify_catalog_signature(tampered, sig, [pubkey]) is False
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Key encryption at rest
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+def test_encrypt_decrypt_round_trip():
+    seed, _pub = r.generate_keypair()
+    blob = r.encrypt_private_key(seed, "correct horse battery staple")
+    decrypted = r.decrypt_private_key(blob, "correct horse battery staple")
+    assert decrypted == seed
+
+
+def test_decrypt_wrong_passphrase_raises():
+    seed, _pub = r.generate_keypair()
+    blob = r.encrypt_private_key(seed, "right passphrase")
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+        r.decrypt_private_key(blob, "wrong passphrase")
+
+
+def test_decrypt_corrupted_blob_raises():
+    seed, _pub = r.generate_keypair()
+    blob = r.encrypt_private_key(seed, "pass")
+    corrupted = blob[:-1] + bytes([blob[-1] ^ 0xFF])
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+        r.decrypt_private_key(corrupted, "pass")
+
+
+def test_encrypt_private_key_rejects_wrong_length_seed():
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+        r.encrypt_private_key(b"too-short", "pass")
+
+
+def test_encrypt_private_key_rejects_empty_passphrase():
+    seed, _pub = r.generate_keypair()
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+        r.encrypt_private_key(seed, "")
+
+
+def test_encrypted_blob_never_contains_seed_plaintext():
+    seed, _pub = r.generate_keypair()
+    blob = r.encrypt_private_key(seed, "some passphrase")
+    assert seed not in blob
+
+
+def test_generate_keypair_produces_valid_ed25519_pair():
+    seed, pubkey = r.generate_keypair()
+    assert len(seed) == 32
+    assert len(pubkey) == 32
+    raw = b"test payload"
+    sig = r.sign_catalog_bytes(raw, seed)
+    assert c.verify_catalog_signature(raw, sig, [pubkey]) is True
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# Registry lookup / near-neighbour edit distance
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+def test_edit_distance_identical():
+    assert r.edit_distance("abc", "abc") == 0
+
+
+def test_edit_distance_one_substitution():
+    assert r.edit_distance("firecrawl-mcp", "f1recrawl-mcp") == 1
+
+
+def test_near_neighbor_ids_finds_close_match():
+    others = ["firecrawl-mcp", "unrelated-server", "totally-different"]
+    neighbors = r.near_neighbor_ids("firecrawl-mcp2", others, max_distance=2)
+    assert "firecrawl-mcp" in neighbors
+
+
+def test_near_neighbor_ids_excludes_self():
+    others = ["filesystem", "other"]
+    assert "filesystem" not in r.near_neighbor_ids("filesystem", others)
+
+
+def test_near_neighbor_ids_excludes_far_matches():
+    others = ["completely-unrelated-name"]
+    assert r.near_neighbor_ids("filesystem", others, max_distance=2) == []
+
+
+def test_extract_package_refs_npm():
+    entry = _entry(config={"command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "@scope/pkg@1.2.3"]})
+    refs = r.extract_package_refs(entry)
+    assert len(refs) == 1
+    assert refs[0].ecosystem == "npm"
+    assert refs[0].name == "@scope/pkg"
+    assert refs[0].version == "1.2.3"
+
+
+def test_extract_package_refs_uvx():
+    entry = _entry(config={"command": "uvx", "args": ["some-pypi-pkg==1.0.0"]})
+    refs = r.extract_package_refs(entry)
+    assert len(refs) == 1
+    assert refs[0].ecosystem == "pypi"
+    assert refs[0].name == "some-pypi-pkg"
+    assert refs[0].version == "1.0.0"
+
+
+def test_extract_package_refs_link_only_entry_returns_empty():
+    entry = {"id": "slack", "setup": "link-only", "docs_url": "https://example.com"}
+    assert r.extract_package_refs(entry) == []
+
+
+def test_lookup_registry_info_fails_soft_on_none():
+    ref = r.PackageRef("x", "npm", "somepkg", "1.0.0")
+    info = r.lookup_registry_info(ref, lambda _ref: None, [])
+    assert info.available is False
+
+
+def test_lookup_registry_info_fails_soft_on_exception():
+    def boom(_ref):
+        raise RuntimeError("network down")
+
+    ref = r.PackageRef("x", "npm", "somepkg", "1.0.0")
+    info = r.lookup_registry_info(ref, boom, [])
+    assert info.available is False
+
+
+def test_lookup_registry_info_populates_fields_when_available():
+    ref = r.PackageRef("x", "npm", "somepkg", "1.0.0")
+
+    def fetcher(_ref):
+        return {
+            "publisher": "hello_sideguide",
+            "age_days": 30,
+            "last_release": "2026-01-01",
+            "downloads": 500,
+        }
+
+    info = r.lookup_registry_info(ref, fetcher, [])
+    assert info.available is True
+    assert info.publisher == "hello_sideguide"
+    assert info.downloads == 500
+
+
+def test_lookup_registry_info_includes_near_neighbors():
+    ref = r.PackageRef("x", "npm", "firecrawl-mcp2", "1.0.0")
+    info = r.lookup_registry_info(ref, lambda _ref: None, ["firecrawl-mcp"])
+    assert "firecrawl-mcp" in info.near_neighbor_ids
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# contains_non_ascii
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+def test_contains_non_ascii_true():
+    assert r.contains_non_ascii("pаckage") is True
+
+
+def test_contains_non_ascii_false():
+    assert r.contains_non_ascii("package") is False
@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
+"""Tests for scripts/sign_checksums.py: SHA256SUMS generation and detached
+Ed25519 signing/verification for release artifacts."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import subprocess
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "scripts"))
+
+import sign_checksums as sc
+
+cryptography = pytest.importorskip("cryptography")
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey  # noqa: E402
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import Encoding, PublicFormat  # noqa: E402
+
+
+def _make_keypair() -> tuple[str, str]:
+    """Return (seed_b64, pubkey_b64) for a fresh Ed25519 keypair."""
+    private_key = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate()
+    seed = private_key.private_bytes_raw()
+    pubkey = private_key.public_key().public_bytes(Encoding.Raw, PublicFormat.Raw)
+    return base64.b64encode(seed).decode("ascii"), base64.b64encode(pubkey).decode("ascii")
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# sha256_file / build_checksums_text / generate_checksums
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+def test_sha256_file_matches_hashlib(tmp_path):
+    f = tmp_path / "a.txt"
+    f.write_bytes(b"hello world")
+    import hashlib
+
+    assert sc.sha256_file(f) == hashlib.sha256(b"hello world").hexdigest()
+
+
+def test_build_checksums_text_sorted_and_formatted():
+    files = {"zeta.zip": "aa" * 32, "alpha.zip": "bb" * 32}
+    text = sc.build_checksums_text(files)
+    lines = text.splitlines()
+    assert lines[0].endswith("alpha.zip")
+    assert lines[1].endswith("zeta.zip")
+    # Standard sha256sum format: hash, two spaces, filename.
+    assert lines[0] == f"{'bb' * 32}  alpha.zip"
+
+
+def test_build_checksums_text_empty():
+    assert sc.build_checksums_text({}) == ""
+
+
+def test_generate_checksums_from_directory(tmp_path):
+    (tmp_path / "b.bin").write_bytes(b"second")
+    (tmp_path / "a.bin").write_bytes(b"first")
+    (tmp_path / "subdir").mkdir()
+    (tmp_path / "subdir" / "ignored.bin").write_bytes(b"nested, not hashed")
+
+    text = sc.generate_checksums(tmp_path)
+    lines = text.splitlines()
+    assert len(lines) == 2
+    assert lines[0].endswith("a.bin")
+    assert lines[1].endswith("b.bin")
+    assert "subdir" not in text
+
+
+def test_generate_checksums_excludes_manifest_files(tmp_path):
+    (tmp_path / "archive.zip").write_bytes(b"payload")
+    (tmp_path / "SHA256SUMS").write_text("stale")
+    (tmp_path / "SHA256SUMS.sig").write_bytes(b"stale-sig")
+
+    text = sc.generate_checksums(tmp_path, exclude={"SHA256SUMS", "SHA256SUMS.sig"})
+    assert "archive.zip" in text
+    assert "SHA256SUMS" not in text.replace("archive.zip", "")
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# sign_checksums / verify_checksums
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+def test_sign_then_verify_roundtrip():
+    seed_b64, pubkey_b64 = _make_keypair()
+    sums_text = "deadbeef" * 8 + "  BetterClaudeConfig-Linux.tar.gz\n"
+
+    signature = sc.sign_checksums(seed_b64, sums_text)
+    assert len(signature) == 64
+    assert sc.verify_checksums(pubkey_b64, sums_text, signature) is True
+
+
+def test_verify_rejects_tampered_checksums():
+    seed_b64, pubkey_b64 = _make_keypair()
+    sums_text = "aa" * 32 + "  file.zip\n"
+    signature = sc.sign_checksums(seed_b64, sums_text)
+
+    tampered = "bb" * 32 + "  file.zip\n"
+    assert sc.verify_checksums(pubkey_b64, tampered, signature) is False
+
+
+def test_verify_rejects_wrong_key():
+    seed_b64, _ = _make_keypair()
+    _, other_pubkey_b64 = _make_keypair()
+    sums_text = "cc" * 32 + "  file.zip\n"
+    signature = sc.sign_checksums(seed_b64, sums_text)
+
+    assert sc.verify_checksums(other_pubkey_b64, sums_text, signature) is False
+
+
+def test_domain_prefix_is_applied():
+    """The signed message must be prefixed, not the raw manifest bytes --
+    otherwise a signature over this manifest could be replayed as a
+    signature over an unrelated message with the same bytes elsewhere."""
+    seed_b64, pubkey_b64 = _make_keypair()
+    sums_text = "11" * 32 + "  file.zip\n"
+
+    from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey as PK
+
+    seed = base64.b64decode(seed_b64)
+    raw_signature = PK.from_private_bytes(seed).sign(sums_text.encode("utf-8"))
+
+    # A signature over the raw (unprefixed) bytes must NOT verify via our
+    # domain-separated verify function.
+    assert sc.verify_checksums(pubkey_b64, sums_text, raw_signature) is False
+
+    # But our own sign_checksums() output does verify.
+    good_signature = sc.sign_checksums(seed_b64, sums_text)
+    assert sc.verify_checksums(pubkey_b64, sums_text, good_signature) is True
+
+
+def test_sign_checksums_rejects_bad_seed_length():
+    bad_seed_b64 = base64.b64encode(b"too-short").decode("ascii")
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+        sc.sign_checksums(bad_seed_b64, "irrelevant\n")
+
+
+def test_verify_checksums_rejects_bad_pubkey_length():
+    seed_b64, _ = _make_keypair()
+    sig = sc.sign_checksums(seed_b64, "irrelevant\n")
+    bad_pubkey_b64 = base64.b64encode(b"too-short").decode("ascii")
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+        sc.verify_checksums(bad_pubkey_b64, "irrelevant\n", sig)
+
+
+def test_public_key_b64_from_seed_matches_generated_pubkey():
+    seed_b64, pubkey_b64 = _make_keypair()
+    assert sc.public_key_b64_from_seed(seed_b64) == pubkey_b64
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+# CLI (end-to-end, via subprocess so argparse wiring is exercised too)
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+SCRIPT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "scripts" / "sign_checksums.py"
+
+
+def _run(*args, env=None):
+    return subprocess.run(
+        [sys.executable, str(SCRIPT), *args],
+        capture_output=True,
+        text=True,
+        env=env,
+    )
+
+
+def test_cli_generate_sign_verify_roundtrip(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    seed_b64, pubkey_b64 = _make_keypair()
+
+    release_dir = tmp_path / "release-files"
+    release_dir.mkdir()
+    (release_dir / "BetterClaudeConfig-Linux.tar.gz").write_bytes(b"fake archive contents")
+    (release_dir / "BetterClaudeConfig-macOS.zip").write_bytes(b"fake zip contents")
+
+    sums_path = release_dir / "SHA256SUMS"
+    sig_path = release_dir / "SHA256SUMS.sig"
+
+    gen = _run("generate", str(release_dir), "--out", str(sums_path))
+    assert gen.returncode == 0, gen.stderr
+    assert sums_path.exists()
+    body = sums_path.read_text()
+    assert "BetterClaudeConfig-Linux.tar.gz" in body
+    assert "BetterClaudeConfig-macOS.zip" in body
+
+    sign = _run("sign", "--sums", str(sums_path), "--out", str(sig_path), "--key-b64", seed_b64)
+    assert sign.returncode == 0, sign.stderr
+    assert sig_path.exists()
+    assert sig_path.stat().st_size == 64
+
+    verify = _run(
+        "verify",
+        "--sums",
+        str(sums_path),
+        "--sig",
+        str(sig_path),
+        "--pubkey-b64",
+        pubkey_b64,
+    )
+    assert verify.returncode == 0, verify.stderr
+    assert "OK" in verify.stdout
+
+
+def test_cli_sign_without_key_fails_loudly(tmp_path):
+    sums_path = tmp_path / "SHA256SUMS"
+    sums_path.write_text("aa" * 32 + "  file.zip\n")
+    sig_path = tmp_path / "SHA256SUMS.sig"
+
+    import os
+
+    env = {k: v for k, v in os.environ.items() if k != "RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY"}
+    result = _run("sign", "--sums", str(sums_path), "--out", str(sig_path), env=env)
+
+    assert result.returncode != 0
+    assert not sig_path.exists(), "must never write a bogus/empty signature file"
+    assert "no signing key" in result.stderr.lower()
+
+
+def test_cli_verify_detects_tampering(tmp_path):
+    seed_b64, pubkey_b64 = _make_keypair()
+    sums_path = tmp_path / "SHA256SUMS"
+    sums_path.write_text("aa" * 32 + "  file.zip\n")
+    sig_path = tmp_path / "SHA256SUMS.sig"
+
+    _run("sign", "--sums", str(sums_path), "--out", str(sig_path), "--key-b64", seed_b64)
+
+    sums_path.write_text("bb" * 32 + "  file.zip\n")  # tamper after signing
+    verify = _run(
+        "verify",
+        "--sums",
+        str(sums_path),
+        "--sig",
+        str(sig_path),
+        "--pubkey-b64",
+        pubkey_b64,
+    )
+    assert verify.returncode != 0
+    assert "FAILED" in verify.stdout + verify.stderr