4836c6cb48
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CI / Catalog signature (pull_request) Failing after 6s
Wires the maintainer's freshly-rotated signing keys into BCC (issue #68 finding 5: the old key was shared between catalog+release and had been exposed to CI), adds a key-rotation re-attestation mode to the Catalog Console so the Console can actually re-sign under the new key, and hardens the show-seed-b64 CLI prompt that led to a private key being pasted into a chat. ## New keys (#68 finding 5) - bcc_core.CATALOG_PUBKEYS -> new CATALOG pubkey (0s24PmkZcTT5yxNDdyTPHl5fyxArrHNPJKBjnXoQd8k=). Signs data/catalog.json, Console-only, offline. - .github/workflows/ci.yml EXPECTED_CATALOG_PUBKEY_B64 -> same new catalog pubkey (the CI trust anchor added for #68 finding 4). - scripts/sign_checksums.py RELEASE_PUBKEYS -> new RELEASE pubkey (6BnPgJEHJFyVltFoLTCNadIsehjy00iiW8IRlC1TfhA=). Signs SHA256SUMS only, CI-resident. - README.md 'Verifying your download' / 'Signing keys' sections filled in with both pubkeys, explicit about which key is which. The old key 082NOwVB7uURkvfyS3+knJ+40Fk6C9unsF47+2uPKo4= is retired (it was shared and exposed to CI) and is deliberately NOT retained in either trust list -- keeping a burned key in CATALOG_PUBKEYS would defeat the point of rotating it. ## Key-rotation re-attestation mode (Catalog Console) Problem: after the key swap, the existing data/catalog.json.sig (signed with the OLD key) no longer verifies under the NEW CATALOG_PUBKEYS, but catalog content is unchanged, so diff_catalogs(last_signed, current) is empty -- and can_sign()'s empty-diff guard (load-bearing, #68 finding 1) correctly refuses to sign an empty changeset. Without a rotation-aware path, the Console could never re-sign and CI would stay red forever. Fix: treat rotation as a full re-attestation, not a diff. - catalog_review.py: ReviewSession/start_review gain reattest: bool = False. When set, changes is built via diff_catalogs(None, new_catalog) -- every entry presented as if newly added, requiring a fresh acknowledgement -- instead of diffing against old_catalog. can_sign() is UNCHANGED: it still refuses a genuinely-empty changeset and still enforces the TOCTOU blob-SHA pin and the blocking-risk check, because reattest sessions simply never produce an empty changeset (unless the catalog itself is empty). - catalog_console.py: adds catalog_signature_valid_at(repo_dir, commit, raw), which calls bcc_core.verify_catalog_signature directly (never reimplemented) to detect whether the committed .sig verifies under the CURRENT CATALOG_PUBKEYS. ReviewWindow._on_load's source=main path uses this to decide reattest=True/False, and shows a loud, explicit red banner ("KEY ROTATION IN PROGRESS...") whenever reattest mode is entered -- never silent. Status text and Sign-button gating flow through the same can_sign()/all_entries_acknowledged() path as normal review. - tests/test_catalog_review.py: 6 new tests covering re-attest mode (one change-entry per server, gating until all acknowledged, then permits), confirming normal mode still refuses an empty diff (rotation path is not a general bypass), and confirming reattest mode still enforces the blocking-risk check and the TOCTOU pin. ## show-seed-b64 hardening (Task 3) The maintainer ran show-seed-b64 --release, saw an ambiguous prompt, and pasted the printed PRIVATE seed into a chat believing it was public. - cmd_show_seed_b64: passphrase prompt is now explicit ("Passphrase for the release signing key (the one YOU chose when generating it)"). A loud three-line warning banner prints to STDERR immediately before the seed ("!!! PRIVATE KEY BELOW..."); the seed itself stays alone on STDOUT so piping into pbcopy or a CI secret field still works cleanly. - cmd_keygen: labels for both key kinds now say PUBLIC/PRIVATE explicitly and state safety properties inline (safe to commit vs. never commit), so the printed output can't be mistaken for the other key's. ## Verification - ruff check . / ruff format --check .: clean. - pytest: full suite green (360 passed, 1 skipped). - Delete-the-check-and-watch-it-fail: each of can_sign()'s four gates (empty-diff, TOCTOU pin, blocking-risk, acknowledge-all) and the reattest branch itself were individually removed and confirmed to turn a test red, then restored -- see PR description for the exact failures. Not touched: data/catalog.json (content-signed, maintainer's job via the Console). No private key generated, requested, or committed. bcc.py untouched (open PR #67).
272 lines
11 KiB
Python
Executable File
272 lines
11 KiB
Python
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env python3
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"""
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Generate a SHA256SUMS file for release artifacts and sign it with Ed25519.
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BCC ships PyInstaller binaries that are not code-signed (no budget for a
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macOS Developer ID / Windows Authenticode certificate). This script provides
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the free half of supply-chain integrity: a checksum manifest, detached-signed
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so downloaders can verify the file they got is the file we published.
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This does NOT remove Gatekeeper/SmartScreen warnings and does NOT prove the
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binary is safe to run -- only that it matches what the release signing key
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attested to.
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Usage:
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# Hash every file in a directory into a SHA256SUMS-format manifest.
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python scripts/sign_checksums.py generate <dir> --out SHA256SUMS
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# Sign a manifest, producing a detached signature.
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# Private key comes from $RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY (base64 raw Ed25519 seed)
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# unless --key-b64 is given explicitly (mostly for tests).
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python scripts/sign_checksums.py sign --sums SHA256SUMS --out SHA256SUMS.sig
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# Verify a manifest against a detached signature and a public key.
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python scripts/sign_checksums.py verify --sums SHA256SUMS --sig SHA256SUMS.sig \
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--pubkey-b64 <base64 raw Ed25519 public key>
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The private key is generated and rotated via the Catalog Console (#62) --
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this script never generates or stores a key itself.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import argparse
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import base64
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import hashlib
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import os
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import sys
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from pathlib import Path
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# Domain separation prefix: ties every signature to "a BCC release checksum
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# manifest" so a signature can never be replayed against an unrelated
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# message signed by the same key.
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DOMAIN_PREFIX = b"bcc-release-v1|"
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# Public half of the RELEASE signing key(s) -- a SEPARATE keypair from
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# bcc_core.CATALOG_PUBKEYS (issue #68 finding 5). The catalog key is the
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# offline, Console-only root of trust for what BCC executes; this key is
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# CI-resident and signs ONLY the release SHA256SUMS manifest, never the
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# catalog. Keeping them apart means a CI/repo-secret compromise burns the
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# release key -- annoying, but it never lets an attacker sign a catalog a
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# user's binary would trust. A LIST (not a single key), mirroring
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# CATALOG_PUBKEYS, so the release key can be rotated without invalidating
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# the signature on every past release: verification accepts a match against
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# ANY key here.
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#
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# Populated by the maintainer via:
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# python catalog_console.py keygen --release
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# Rotated 2026-07 (issue #68 finding 5 / #68 CI-exposure incident): the
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# original key was shared with the catalog key and had been exposed to CI,
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# so both keypairs were regenerated as separate, disjoint keys. This list
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# holds only the current release key -- if release.yml's signing-smoke-test
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# ever sees this list empty, it fails closed (loudly) rather than silently
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# verifying against nothing.
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RELEASE_PUBKEYS: list[bytes] = [
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base64.b64decode("6BnPgJEHJFyVltFoLTCNadIsehjy00iiW8IRlC1TfhA="),
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]
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CHUNK_SIZE = 1024 * 1024
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def sha256_file(path: Path) -> str:
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"""Return the lowercase hex SHA-256 digest of a file's contents."""
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digest = hashlib.sha256()
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with open(path, "rb") as fh:
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while chunk := fh.read(CHUNK_SIZE):
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digest.update(chunk)
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return digest.hexdigest()
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def build_checksums_text(files: dict[str, str]) -> str:
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"""Build a sha256sum(1)-compatible manifest body.
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`files` maps filename -> hex digest. Entries are sorted by filename for
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a deterministic, diffable output. Format matches `sha256sum` exactly:
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"<hash> <filename>\n" (two spaces, no path components).
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"""
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lines = [f"{digest} {name}" for name, digest in sorted(files.items())]
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body = "\n".join(lines)
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return body + "\n" if body else ""
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def generate_checksums(directory: Path, *, exclude: set[str] | None = None) -> str:
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"""Hash every regular file directly inside `directory` (non-recursive)
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and return the SHA256SUMS text. Filenames are recorded without any
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directory prefix so the manifest can be verified from inside the
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directory it describes.
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"""
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exclude = exclude or set()
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files: dict[str, str] = {}
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for entry in sorted(directory.iterdir()):
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if not entry.is_file():
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continue
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if entry.name in exclude:
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continue
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files[entry.name] = sha256_file(entry)
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return build_checksums_text(files)
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def _signing_message(sums_text: str) -> bytes:
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"""The exact bytes that get signed: the domain prefix followed by the
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raw bytes of the SHA256SUMS file content."""
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return DOMAIN_PREFIX + sums_text.encode("utf-8")
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def sign_checksums(seed_b64: str, sums_text: str) -> bytes:
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"""Sign `sums_text` with the Ed25519 private key encoded (base64, raw
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32-byte seed) in `seed_b64`. Returns the raw 64-byte signature."""
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# Imported lazily so `generate` mode (used on every CI run) never
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# requires the `cryptography` package to be installed.
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
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seed = base64.b64decode(seed_b64)
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if len(seed) != 32:
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raise ValueError(f"expected a 32-byte raw Ed25519 seed, got {len(seed)} bytes")
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private_key = Ed25519PrivateKey.from_private_bytes(seed)
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return private_key.sign(_signing_message(sums_text))
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def verify_checksums(pubkey_b64: str, sums_text: str, signature: bytes) -> bool:
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"""Verify `signature` over `sums_text` against the base64-encoded raw
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32-byte Ed25519 public key. Returns True/False; never raises for a bad
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signature (only for malformed inputs)."""
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from cryptography.exceptions import InvalidSignature
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PublicKey
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pubkey_bytes = base64.b64decode(pubkey_b64)
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if len(pubkey_bytes) != 32:
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raise ValueError(
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f"expected a 32-byte raw Ed25519 public key, got {len(pubkey_bytes)} bytes"
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)
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public_key = Ed25519PublicKey.from_public_bytes(pubkey_bytes)
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try:
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public_key.verify(signature, _signing_message(sums_text))
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return True
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except InvalidSignature:
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return False
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def public_key_b64_from_seed(seed_b64: str) -> str:
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"""Derive the base64 raw public key from a base64 raw seed. Handy for
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local key-pair sanity checks; not used by the release workflow."""
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import Encoding, PublicFormat
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seed = base64.b64decode(seed_b64)
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private_key = Ed25519PrivateKey.from_private_bytes(seed)
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raw = private_key.public_key().public_bytes(Encoding.Raw, PublicFormat.Raw)
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return base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii")
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def verify_checksums_against_any(pubkeys: list[bytes], sums_text: str, signature: bytes) -> bool:
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"""Verify `signature` against ANY key in `pubkeys` (each a raw 32-byte
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Ed25519 public key). Mirrors bcc_core.verify_catalog_signature's
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rotation-friendly "any currently-trusted key" semantics, applied to
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RELEASE_PUBKEYS instead of the catalog's key list. Returns False (never
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raises) for an empty `pubkeys` list -- fails closed rather than
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vacuously verifying against nothing."""
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return any(
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verify_checksums(base64.b64encode(pk).decode("ascii"), sums_text, signature)
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for pk in pubkeys
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)
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
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# CLI
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
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def _cmd_generate(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
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directory = Path(args.directory)
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exclude = {"SHA256SUMS", "SHA256SUMS.sig"}
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text = generate_checksums(directory, exclude=exclude)
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out_path = Path(args.out)
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out_path.write_text(text, encoding="utf-8")
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print(f"Wrote {out_path} ({len(text.splitlines())} entries)")
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return 0
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def _cmd_sign(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
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seed_b64 = args.key_b64 or os.environ.get(args.key_env, "")
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if not seed_b64:
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print(
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f"error: no signing key provided (checked --key-b64 and ${args.key_env})",
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file=sys.stderr,
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)
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return 1
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sums_text = Path(args.sums).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
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signature = sign_checksums(seed_b64, sums_text)
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Path(args.out).write_bytes(signature)
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print(f"Wrote {args.out} ({len(signature)} bytes)")
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return 0
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def _cmd_verify(args: argparse.Namespace) -> int:
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pubkey_b64 = args.pubkey_b64 or os.environ.get(args.pubkey_env, "")
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if not pubkey_b64:
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print(
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f"error: no public key provided (checked --pubkey-b64 and ${args.pubkey_env})",
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file=sys.stderr,
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)
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return 1
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sums_text = Path(args.sums).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
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signature = Path(args.sig).read_bytes()
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ok = verify_checksums(pubkey_b64, sums_text, signature)
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if ok:
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print("OK: signature is valid")
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return 0
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print("FAILED: signature is invalid", file=sys.stderr)
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return 1
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def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
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parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
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description=__doc__, formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter
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)
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sub = parser.add_subparsers(dest="mode", required=True)
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p_gen = sub.add_parser(
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"generate", help="hash every file in a directory into a SHA256SUMS manifest"
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)
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p_gen.add_argument("directory", help="directory whose files should be hashed (non-recursive)")
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p_gen.add_argument("--out", required=True, help="path to write the SHA256SUMS manifest to")
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p_gen.set_defaults(func=_cmd_generate)
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p_sign = sub.add_parser("sign", help="detached-sign a SHA256SUMS manifest with Ed25519")
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p_sign.add_argument("--sums", required=True, help="path to the SHA256SUMS manifest to sign")
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p_sign.add_argument("--out", required=True, help="path to write the detached signature to")
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p_sign.add_argument(
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"--key-b64", default=None, help="base64 raw Ed25519 seed (overrides --key-env)"
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)
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p_sign.add_argument(
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"--key-env",
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default="RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY",
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help="environment variable holding the base64 seed (default: RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY)",
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)
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p_sign.set_defaults(func=_cmd_sign)
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p_verify = sub.add_parser(
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"verify", help="verify a SHA256SUMS manifest against a detached signature"
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)
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p_verify.add_argument("--sums", required=True, help="path to the SHA256SUMS manifest")
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p_verify.add_argument("--sig", required=True, help="path to the detached signature")
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p_verify.add_argument(
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"--pubkey-b64", default=None, help="base64 raw Ed25519 public key (overrides --pubkey-env)"
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)
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p_verify.add_argument(
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"--pubkey-env",
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default="RELEASE_SIGNING_PUBKEY",
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help="environment variable holding the base64 public key (default: RELEASE_SIGNING_PUBKEY)",
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)
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p_verify.set_defaults(func=_cmd_verify)
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return parser
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def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
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parser = build_parser()
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args = parser.parse_args(argv)
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return args.func(args)
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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raise SystemExit(main())
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