3 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
BCC Agent	4836c6cb48	chore(#68): rotate signing keys, key-rotation re-attestation mode, harden show-seed-b64 ... Wires the maintainer's freshly-rotated signing keys into BCC (issue #68 finding 5: the old key was shared between catalog+release and had been exposed to CI), adds a key-rotation re-attestation mode to the Catalog Console so the Console can actually re-sign under the new key, and hardens the show-seed-b64 CLI prompt that led to a private key being pasted into a chat. ## New keys (#68 finding 5) - bcc_core.CATALOG_PUBKEYS -> new CATALOG pubkey (0s24PmkZcTT5yxNDdyTPHl5fyxArrHNPJKBjnXoQd8k=). Signs data/catalog.json, Console-only, offline. - .github/workflows/ci.yml EXPECTED_CATALOG_PUBKEY_B64 -> same new catalog pubkey (the CI trust anchor added for #68 finding 4). - scripts/sign_checksums.py RELEASE_PUBKEYS -> new RELEASE pubkey (6BnPgJEHJFyVltFoLTCNadIsehjy00iiW8IRlC1TfhA=). Signs SHA256SUMS only, CI-resident. - README.md 'Verifying your download' / 'Signing keys' sections filled in with both pubkeys, explicit about which key is which. The old key 082NOwVB7uURkvfyS3+knJ+40Fk6C9unsF47+2uPKo4= is retired (it was shared and exposed to CI) and is deliberately NOT retained in either trust list -- keeping a burned key in CATALOG_PUBKEYS would defeat the point of rotating it. ## Key-rotation re-attestation mode (Catalog Console) Problem: after the key swap, the existing data/catalog.json.sig (signed with the OLD key) no longer verifies under the NEW CATALOG_PUBKEYS, but catalog content is unchanged, so diff_catalogs(last_signed, current) is empty -- and can_sign()'s empty-diff guard (load-bearing, #68 finding 1) correctly refuses to sign an empty changeset. Without a rotation-aware path, the Console could never re-sign and CI would stay red forever. Fix: treat rotation as a full re-attestation, not a diff. - catalog_review.py: ReviewSession/start_review gain reattest: bool = False. When set, changes is built via diff_catalogs(None, new_catalog) -- every entry presented as if newly added, requiring a fresh acknowledgement -- instead of diffing against old_catalog. can_sign() is UNCHANGED: it still refuses a genuinely-empty changeset and still enforces the TOCTOU blob-SHA pin and the blocking-risk check, because reattest sessions simply never produce an empty changeset (unless the catalog itself is empty). - catalog_console.py: adds catalog_signature_valid_at(repo_dir, commit, raw), which calls bcc_core.verify_catalog_signature directly (never reimplemented) to detect whether the committed .sig verifies under the CURRENT CATALOG_PUBKEYS. ReviewWindow._on_load's source=main path uses this to decide reattest=True/False, and shows a loud, explicit red banner ("KEY ROTATION IN PROGRESS...") whenever reattest mode is entered -- never silent. Status text and Sign-button gating flow through the same can_sign()/all_entries_acknowledged() path as normal review. - tests/test_catalog_review.py: 6 new tests covering re-attest mode (one change-entry per server, gating until all acknowledged, then permits), confirming normal mode still refuses an empty diff (rotation path is not a general bypass), and confirming reattest mode still enforces the blocking-risk check and the TOCTOU pin. ## show-seed-b64 hardening (Task 3) The maintainer ran show-seed-b64 --release, saw an ambiguous prompt, and pasted the printed PRIVATE seed into a chat believing it was public. - cmd_show_seed_b64: passphrase prompt is now explicit ("Passphrase for the release signing key (the one YOU chose when generating it)"). A loud three-line warning banner prints to STDERR immediately before the seed ("!!! PRIVATE KEY BELOW..."); the seed itself stays alone on STDOUT so piping into pbcopy or a CI secret field still works cleanly. - cmd_keygen: labels for both key kinds now say PUBLIC/PRIVATE explicitly and state safety properties inline (safe to commit vs. never commit), so the printed output can't be mistaken for the other key's. ## Verification - ruff check . / ruff format --check .: clean. - pytest: full suite green (360 passed, 1 skipped). - Delete-the-check-and-watch-it-fail: each of can_sign()'s four gates (empty-diff, TOCTOU pin, blocking-risk, acknowledge-all) and the reattest branch itself were individually removed and confirmed to turn a test red, then restored -- see PR description for the exact failures. Not touched: data/catalog.json (content-signed, maintainer's job via the Console). No private key generated, requested, or committed. bcc.py untouched (open PR #67).	2026-07-13 12:24:28 -04:00
BCC Fix Agent	82483e693d	fix(catalog-console): close the vacuous review gate; split catalog/release signing keys ... Fixes #68 findings 1 and 5. Finding 1 -- the review gate signed without reviewing anything: - ReviewWindow._on_sign hardcoded "main" as the TOCTOU comparison ref, so any PR review (where _on_load pins the PR head's blob SHA) could never sign; the only working path was main-vs-itself, whose empty diff made can_sign() vacuously True (set() <= set()). Commit b08cf21 signed 19 entries through exactly that path with zero of them reviewed. - can_sign() now refuses an empty changeset outright, and itself checks has_blocking_risk() across every changed entry rather than trusting the GUI to have disabled a checkbox. - ReviewSession now carries loaded_ref (the exact ref reviewed); a new pure sign_precondition(session, resolve_blob_sha) resolves the TOCTOU SHA from that ref, never a hardcoded "main". _on_load's retry path re-diffs instead of re-pinning the same stale SHA, so a blob-mismatch refusal can't loop forever. - source="main" now diffs against the last catalog a maintainer actually SIGNED (walking catalog.json's git history until a version verifies against the current .sig), not against itself. - Replaced the theatre-only test_no_acknowledge_all_function_exists (only asserted no function was *named* acknowledge_all) with a test that also exercises the real gate. Added can_sign/sign_precondition coverage for the empty-diff, blocking-risk, and ref-resolution seams -- each verified to fail when its guard is removed. Finding 5 -- the catalog key and release key were the same CI-resident key: - scripts/sign_checksums.py gets its own RELEASE_PUBKEYS (separate from bcc_core.CATALOG_PUBKEYS) and a verify_checksums_against_any() helper. - release.yml's signing-smoke-test now verifies RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY against RELEASE_PUBKEYS only -- it no longer imports bcc_core/CATALOG_PUBKEYS at all, so this workflow can never compare a CI secret against the catalog's root of trust. - catalog_console.py: keygen/show-seed-b64 gain --release, with separate keychain/file storage per key kind. show-seed-b64 refuses to run without --release, so the catalog seed can't be exported to a CI secret by habit. - README documents both keys' trust properties and the asymmetry: a CI compromise burns the release key, never the catalog key. The maintainer must rotate the catalog key (it was CI-resident, so treat it as burned for catalog use) and generate a fresh release key -- see the PR description for the exact steps. No key is generated or committed here.	2026-07-12 21:25:34 -04:00
BCC Agent	cd38fd0c78	Sign release checksums with Ed25519 (#63) ... Publish SHA256SUMS for every release archive and sign it with a detached Ed25519 signature (SHA256SUMS.sig), since paid code signing (macOS Developer ID, Windows Authenticode) and Sigstore keyless (needs a Fulcio-trusted OIDC issuer; self-hosted Gitea isn't one) are both out of budget/scope. - scripts/sign_checksums.py: dependency-light (cryptography only) helper to hash a directory of files into a sha256sum(1)-compatible SHA256SUMS manifest, sign it (domain-separated: b"bcc-release-v1|" + raw manifest bytes), and verify a signature. CLI has generate/ sign/verify subcommands; verify doubles as the check path. - tests/test_checksums.py: 15 unit + CLI-subprocess tests covering hashing, manifest formatting, sign/verify roundtrip, tamper detection, wrong-key rejection, domain-separation, and the no-key-provided failure path (must error, never write an empty/ bogus .sig). - .github/workflows/release.yml: Publish Release job now checks out the repo, flattens build artifacts, generates SHA256SUMS, and signs it from the RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY secret (base64 raw Ed25519 seed) if present. If the secret is absent, the release still publishes with a loud ::warning:: and no .sig — it never fails the release or publishes a bogus signature. - README.md: new 'Verifying your download' section with the (still placeholder) public key, sha256sum -c / Get-FileHash commands, and an explicit statement that this does not remove Gatekeeper/ SmartScreen warnings. - requirements-dev.txt / ci.yml: add cryptography as a dev/test dependency for the new script and its tests. Touches no files from bcc_core.py / tests/test_core.py / pyproject.toml / bcc.spec to avoid colliding with concurrent work on those files.	2026-07-12 17:30:09 -04:00