BCC Agent
4836c6cb48
CI / Lint (ruff) (pull_request) Successful in 9s
CI / Tests (py3.10 / ubuntu-latest) (pull_request) Successful in 11s
CI / Tests (py3.12 / ubuntu-latest) (pull_request) Successful in 10s
CI / Tests (py3.12 / windows-latest) (pull_request) Successful in 35s
CI / Tests (py3.13 / ubuntu-latest) (pull_request) Successful in 10s
CI / Catalog signature (pull_request) Failing after 6s
Wires the maintainer's freshly-rotated signing keys into BCC (issue #68 finding 5: the old key was shared between catalog+release and had been exposed to CI), adds a key-rotation re-attestation mode to the Catalog Console so the Console can actually re-sign under the new key, and hardens the show-seed-b64 CLI prompt that led to a private key being pasted into a chat. ## New keys (#68 finding 5) - bcc_core.CATALOG_PUBKEYS -> new CATALOG pubkey (0s24PmkZcTT5yxNDdyTPHl5fyxArrHNPJKBjnXoQd8k=). Signs data/catalog.json, Console-only, offline. - .github/workflows/ci.yml EXPECTED_CATALOG_PUBKEY_B64 -> same new catalog pubkey (the CI trust anchor added for #68 finding 4). - scripts/sign_checksums.py RELEASE_PUBKEYS -> new RELEASE pubkey (6BnPgJEHJFyVltFoLTCNadIsehjy00iiW8IRlC1TfhA=). Signs SHA256SUMS only, CI-resident. - README.md 'Verifying your download' / 'Signing keys' sections filled in with both pubkeys, explicit about which key is which. The old key 082NOwVB7uURkvfyS3+knJ+40Fk6C9unsF47+2uPKo4= is retired (it was shared and exposed to CI) and is deliberately NOT retained in either trust list -- keeping a burned key in CATALOG_PUBKEYS would defeat the point of rotating it. ## Key-rotation re-attestation mode (Catalog Console) Problem: after the key swap, the existing data/catalog.json.sig (signed with the OLD key) no longer verifies under the NEW CATALOG_PUBKEYS, but catalog content is unchanged, so diff_catalogs(last_signed, current) is empty -- and can_sign()'s empty-diff guard (load-bearing, #68 finding 1) correctly refuses to sign an empty changeset. Without a rotation-aware path, the Console could never re-sign and CI would stay red forever. Fix: treat rotation as a full re-attestation, not a diff. - catalog_review.py: ReviewSession/start_review gain reattest: bool = False. When set, changes is built via diff_catalogs(None, new_catalog) -- every entry presented as if newly added, requiring a fresh acknowledgement -- instead of diffing against old_catalog. can_sign() is UNCHANGED: it still refuses a genuinely-empty changeset and still enforces the TOCTOU blob-SHA pin and the blocking-risk check, because reattest sessions simply never produce an empty changeset (unless the catalog itself is empty). - catalog_console.py: adds catalog_signature_valid_at(repo_dir, commit, raw), which calls bcc_core.verify_catalog_signature directly (never reimplemented) to detect whether the committed .sig verifies under the CURRENT CATALOG_PUBKEYS. ReviewWindow._on_load's source=main path uses this to decide reattest=True/False, and shows a loud, explicit red banner ("KEY ROTATION IN PROGRESS...") whenever reattest mode is entered -- never silent. Status text and Sign-button gating flow through the same can_sign()/all_entries_acknowledged() path as normal review. - tests/test_catalog_review.py: 6 new tests covering re-attest mode (one change-entry per server, gating until all acknowledged, then permits), confirming normal mode still refuses an empty diff (rotation path is not a general bypass), and confirming reattest mode still enforces the blocking-risk check and the TOCTOU pin. ## show-seed-b64 hardening (Task 3) The maintainer ran show-seed-b64 --release, saw an ambiguous prompt, and pasted the printed PRIVATE seed into a chat believing it was public. - cmd_show_seed_b64: passphrase prompt is now explicit ("Passphrase for the release signing key (the one YOU chose when generating it)"). A loud three-line warning banner prints to STDERR immediately before the seed ("!!! PRIVATE KEY BELOW..."); the seed itself stays alone on STDOUT so piping into pbcopy or a CI secret field still works cleanly. - cmd_keygen: labels for both key kinds now say PUBLIC/PRIVATE explicitly and state safety properties inline (safe to commit vs. never commit), so the printed output can't be mistaken for the other key's. ## Verification - ruff check . / ruff format --check .: clean. - pytest: full suite green (360 passed, 1 skipped). - Delete-the-check-and-watch-it-fail: each of can_sign()'s four gates (empty-diff, TOCTOU pin, blocking-risk, acknowledge-all) and the reattest branch itself were individually removed and confirmed to turn a test red, then restored -- see PR description for the exact failures. Not touched: data/catalog.json (content-signed, maintainer's job via the Console). No private key generated, requested, or committed. bcc.py untouched (open PR #67).
236 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
236 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
# Better Claude Config (BCC)
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A small, cross-platform GUI for editing the `mcpServers` block of Claude Desktop
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and Claude Code installs — without ever hand-writing JSON.
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BCC only ever touches `mcpServers` (and its own `_disabledMcpServers` parking
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key). Every other key in your config is preserved verbatim, in its original
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order. Each write is atomic and makes a timestamped backup first.
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## Download (no Python required)
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Pre-built self-contained binaries are attached to every [GitHub Release](../../releases):
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| Platform | Download | Run |
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|----------|----------|-----|
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| macOS | `BetterClaudeConfig-macOS.zip` | Unzip → drag **BetterClaudeConfig.app** to Applications |
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| Windows | `BetterClaudeConfig-Windows.zip` | Unzip → double-click **BetterClaudeConfig.exe** |
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| Linux | `BetterClaudeConfig-Linux.tar.gz` | Extract → run **BetterClaudeConfig** |
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> **macOS Gatekeeper note:** the app is not notarized. On first launch, right-click → **Open**, or run `xattr -cr /Applications/BetterClaudeConfig.app` in a terminal.
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## Verifying your download
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BCC isn't code-signed — there's no budget for a paid certificate (macOS
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Developer ID, Windows Authenticode). Instead, every release publishes a
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`SHA256SUMS` file listing the checksum of each archive, detached-signed with
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Ed25519 as `SHA256SUMS.sig`. Both are attached to the release alongside the
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binaries.
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**What this proves:** the file you downloaded is byte-for-byte what we
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published, and the manifest itself was signed by our release key.
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**What this does NOT do:** it does not make the binary "safe," and it does
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**not** remove the macOS Gatekeeper or Windows SmartScreen warning — those
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are only suppressed by a paid OS-vendor certificate, which this project
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doesn't have. Verifying checksums is about detecting tampering in transit or
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on a mirror, not about vouching for the software.
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This manifest is signed with BCC's **release key**, which is a different
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key from the one that signs the MCP server catalog — see
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[Signing keys](#signing-keys) below for why, and for the public key value
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to use with `--pubkey-b64` below.
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### macOS / Linux
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```bash
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# From inside the folder you downloaded the release files into:
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sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS
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```
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If your `sha256sum` complains about missing files, download `SHA256SUMS`
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into the same directory as the archive you downloaded — it lists every
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platform's archive, and only the one(s) present will be checked.
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To also verify the manifest's signature (optional, requires Python +
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`pip install cryptography` and a checkout of this repo):
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```bash
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python3 scripts/sign_checksums.py verify \
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--sums SHA256SUMS --sig SHA256SUMS.sig \
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--pubkey-b64 "<the release public key from Signing keys, below>"
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```
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### Windows (PowerShell)
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```powershell
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Get-FileHash .\BetterClaudeConfig-Windows.zip -Algorithm SHA256
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```
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Compare the printed hash (case-insensitively) against the matching line in
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`SHA256SUMS`.
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### If a release has no `SHA256SUMS.sig`
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The signing key is a repo secret that has to be configured manually; if a
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release is missing the `.sig` file, the checksums themselves are still
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valid and safe to check against — the release workflow only skips signing,
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never checksum generation.
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## Signing keys
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BCC uses **two separate Ed25519 keypairs**, deliberately never the same
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key, because they protect different things and live in different places:
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| | Catalog key | Release key |
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|---|---|---|
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| Signs | `data/catalog.json` (the MCP server catalog every user's app trusts) | `SHA256SUMS` (the checksum manifest for release binaries) |
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| Verified by | `bcc_core.CATALOG_PUBKEYS` | `scripts/sign_checksums.RELEASE_PUBKEYS` |
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| Lives | Offline, passphrase-encrypted, maintainer's machine only (OS keychain or an encrypted file outside the repo — see the [Catalog Console](#files), issue #62) | A Gitea Actions repo secret, `RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY` — **intentionally CI-resident** |
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| Generated with | `python catalog_console.py keygen` | `python catalog_console.py keygen --release` |
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| Exported for CI with | *(never — there is no supported way to export this key)* | `python catalog_console.py show-seed-b64 --release` |
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**Why two keys:** the catalog key is the root of trust for what BCC
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actually *executes* on a user's machine — every `command`/`args` pair in
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the shipped catalog is only there because this key signed it. If that key
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and the release-checksum key were the same (as they briefly were — see
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[issue #68](../../issues/68)), then anything that can exfiltrate a Gitea
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Actions secret (a malicious workflow-file PR, a compromised runner, a leaky
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log) could sign a catalog every user's copy of BCC would trust, not just a
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checksum manifest. Splitting them means **a CI/secret compromise burns the
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release key, never the catalog key** — checksums for a future release could
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be forged, which is bad, but no attacker gains the ability to make BCC run
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arbitrary commands on installs that trust the catalog. That asymmetry is
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the entire point of having two keys instead of one.
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The catalog key is **never** meant to leave the maintainer's machine: it's
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generated, stored, unlocked, and used to sign entirely inside the Catalog
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Console (`catalog_console.py`), and `catalog_console.py show-seed-b64`
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refuses to run without `--release` specifically so the catalog seed can't
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be exported by habit or muscle memory.
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**Release signing public key** (Ed25519, base64, raw 32 bytes) — this is
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the RELEASE key, which signs `SHA256SUMS` (release checksums). It does
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**not** sign `data/catalog.json` and is not the key `bcc_core.CATALOG_PUBKEYS`
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trusts:
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```
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6BnPgJEHJFyVltFoLTCNadIsehjy00iiW8IRlC1TfhA=
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```
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The catalog public key (Ed25519, base64, raw 32 bytes) — this is the key
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that signs `data/catalog.json` and is trusted via `bcc_core.CATALOG_PUBKEYS`
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and the CI trust anchor in `.github/workflows/ci.yml`. It is listed here
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for completeness, not because you need it to verify a download — use the
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*release* key above for that:
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```
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0s24PmkZcTT5yxNDdyTPHl5fyxArrHNPJKBjnXoQd8k=
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```
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Both keys above were rotated 2026-07 — see [issue #68](../../issues/68)
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finding 5. The prior (shared) key is retired and is deliberately **not**
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kept in either trust list; retaining a burned key would defeat the point
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of rotating it.
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## Run from source
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```bash
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pip install -r requirements.txt
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python bcc.py
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```
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(Python 3.10+, PySide6 6.6+.)
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## What it does
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- **Auto-discovers installs** — scans the platform's app-support folder for any
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`Claude*` directory (so `Claude` and `Claude-Work` both show up) **and** finds
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Claude Code's user-scope config at `~/.claude.json` (the file `claude mcp add`
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writes). Use **Add config…** to point at any other file manually — e.g. a
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project's `.mcp.json`.
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- **Form-based editing** — name, command, args (one per line), env vars, or for
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remote servers: URL, transport, and headers. No raw JSON.
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- **Paste JSON — even broken JSON** — drop in any snippet from an MCP doc (full
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`mcpServers` block, inner map, or a single bare server object); it's parsed
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and merged. The paste box parses as you type and auto-repairs the stuff docs
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and chat windows love to break: markdown fences, surrounding prose, comments,
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trailing or missing commas, smart quotes, single quotes, unquoted keys, and
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unclosed braces — and tells you exactly what it fixed before you commit.
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- **Drag & drop** a `.json` file onto the window to import servers from it.
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- **Copy to ▸** — copy the selected server straight into your *other* install.
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- **Active / Disabled sections** — servers are shown in two labelled lists with
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live counts, so a server that's switched off in the config is obvious at a
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glance. Toggle a server's checkbox to move it between sections (disabled
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servers are parked under `_disabledMcpServers`, which Claude ignores).
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- **Dependency check + diagnostics** — each server shows whether its `command`
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is actually found on PATH:
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- ● green — found on the normal PATH; will work anywhere.
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- ▲ amber (**PATH-risk**) — found, but *only* in a location BCC added on top of
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the inherited PATH. It'll work when you launch Claude from a terminal, but a
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double-clicked `.app` may not see it. This is the usual cause of "the tool
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says it's fine but Claude won't start the server." One click on **Use full
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path ↳** rewrites the bare command (`npx`) to its absolute path so any launch
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finds it.
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- ● red (**broken**) — not found anywhere.
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- ◆ blue — remote (url) server. **Test connection** does a live reachability
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check on a background thread (any HTTP response = reachable).
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Each section header shows a **broken / PATH-risk count badge**, and selecting a
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flagged server auto-opens a **Details** panel with a full, copy-pasteable
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report: which command resolved to what, tailored install hints, and the exact
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PATH that was searched (with `+` marking the dirs BCC added). **Re-check**
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re-scans PATH after you install something; **Copy diagnostics** grabs the whole
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report for a bug report.
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After saving, **restart that Claude install** for changes to take effect.
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## Config locations it scans
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**Claude Desktop**
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| OS | Base it scans for `Claude*` |
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|---------|----------------------------------|
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| macOS | `~/Library/Application Support` |
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| Windows | `%APPDATA%` |
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| Linux | `~/.config` |
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**Claude Code** (all platforms): `~/.claude.json` (user scope). If servers are
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found parked in `~/.claude/settings.json` — where Claude Code ignores them — that
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file is also listed, marked *legacy*, so you can copy them over.
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## Files
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- `bcc.py` — the GUI.
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- `bcc_core.py` — all the file/JSON/validation/dependency logic (no GUI deps).
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- `test_core.py` — unit suite for the core (`python test_core.py`).
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- `bcc.spec` — PyInstaller build spec (cross-platform).
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- `scripts/build_icons.py` — regenerates `icons/app.icns` and `icons/app.ico` from source PNGs.
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- `scripts/sign_checksums.py` — generates and Ed25519-signs the release `SHA256SUMS` manifest (see [Verifying your download](#verifying-your-download)).
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- `catalog_console.py` / `catalog_review.py` — **maintainer-only**, never shipped to users (excluded from `bcc.spec`; see `tests/test_catalog_console_packaging.py`). The Catalog Console: review + sign `data/catalog.json`, and generate/manage both signing keys (`keygen`, `keygen --release`) — see [Signing keys](#signing-keys).
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## Building from source
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```bash
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pip install -r requirements-dev.txt
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python scripts/build_icons.py # regenerate icons if needed
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pyinstaller bcc.spec
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# macOS → dist/BetterClaudeConfig.app
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# Windows → dist/BetterClaudeConfig.exe
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# Linux → dist/BetterClaudeConfig
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```
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Releases are built automatically by GitHub Actions (`.github/workflows/release.yml`) when a version tag is pushed:
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```bash
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git tag v1.0.0 && git push --tags
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```
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## Rebrand
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The accent color is one constant (`ACCENT`) at the top of `bcc.py`.
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## License
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MIT — see [LICENSE](LICENSE).
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