fix(catalog-console): close the vacuous review gate; split catalog/release signing keys (#68 findings 1, 5) #69

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the_og merged 2 commits from fix/68-console-gate into main 2026-07-12 21:30:13 -04:00

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Author	SHA1	Message	Date
the_og	26c66b7db1	Merge branch 'main' into fix/68-console-gate	2026-07-12 21:28:27 -04:00
BCC Fix Agent	82483e693d	fix(catalog-console): close the vacuous review gate; split catalog/release signing keys ... Fixes #68 findings 1 and 5. Finding 1 -- the review gate signed without reviewing anything: - ReviewWindow._on_sign hardcoded "main" as the TOCTOU comparison ref, so any PR review (where _on_load pins the PR head's blob SHA) could never sign; the only working path was main-vs-itself, whose empty diff made can_sign() vacuously True (set() <= set()). Commit b08cf21 signed 19 entries through exactly that path with zero of them reviewed. - can_sign() now refuses an empty changeset outright, and itself checks has_blocking_risk() across every changed entry rather than trusting the GUI to have disabled a checkbox. - ReviewSession now carries loaded_ref (the exact ref reviewed); a new pure sign_precondition(session, resolve_blob_sha) resolves the TOCTOU SHA from that ref, never a hardcoded "main". _on_load's retry path re-diffs instead of re-pinning the same stale SHA, so a blob-mismatch refusal can't loop forever. - source="main" now diffs against the last catalog a maintainer actually SIGNED (walking catalog.json's git history until a version verifies against the current .sig), not against itself. - Replaced the theatre-only test_no_acknowledge_all_function_exists (only asserted no function was *named* acknowledge_all) with a test that also exercises the real gate. Added can_sign/sign_precondition coverage for the empty-diff, blocking-risk, and ref-resolution seams -- each verified to fail when its guard is removed. Finding 5 -- the catalog key and release key were the same CI-resident key: - scripts/sign_checksums.py gets its own RELEASE_PUBKEYS (separate from bcc_core.CATALOG_PUBKEYS) and a verify_checksums_against_any() helper. - release.yml's signing-smoke-test now verifies RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY against RELEASE_PUBKEYS only -- it no longer imports bcc_core/CATALOG_PUBKEYS at all, so this workflow can never compare a CI secret against the catalog's root of trust. - catalog_console.py: keygen/show-seed-b64 gain --release, with separate keychain/file storage per key kind. show-seed-b64 refuses to run without --release, so the catalog seed can't be exported to a CI secret by habit. - README documents both keys' trust properties and the asymmetry: a CI compromise burns the release key, never the catalog key. The maintainer must rotate the catalog key (it was CI-resident, so treat it as burned for catalog use) and generate a fresh release key -- see the PR description for the exact steps. No key is generated or committed here.	2026-07-12 21:25:34 -04:00