ci: gate the catalog signature, smoke-test the release key (#61, #63)
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Two gaps closed now that a real key exists. 1. CI 'Catalog signature' job (the #61 gate): every push/PR verifies data/catalog.json against data/catalog.json.sig using the public key in bcc_core, and runs validate_catalog. The threat model here is not an outsider pushing to the repo -- it is merging a friendly-looking PR without really reading it. A contributor can change catalog.json but cannot produce a matching signature, so a blindly-merged PR now lands as a red build within a minute instead of quietly riding into the next release. Public-key only; no secret involved. 2. release.yml 'Signing key smoke test' (workflow_dispatch only): the Publish job is gated on a tag, so a manual run never exercised signing -- a wrong or missing RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY would first surface during a real release. This signs a throwaway manifest with the secret and verifies it against the public key compiled into bcc_core, proving the two halves of the keypair actually match. Publishes nothing.
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@@ -95,6 +95,69 @@ jobs:
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name: ${{ matrix.artifact }}
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path: ${{ matrix.artifact }}
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# ── Signing-key smoke test (workflow_dispatch only) ─────────────────────
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#
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# The Publish job is gated on a tag, so a manual run never exercises the
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# signing step — which means a wrong/missing RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY secret
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# would only be discovered at the worst possible moment: during a real
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# release. This job signs a throwaway manifest with the secret and verifies
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# the result against the PUBLIC key already compiled into bcc_core.
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#
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# It proves the two halves of the keypair actually match, without
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# publishing anything. Run it from the Actions tab after setting or
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# rotating the secret.
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signing-smoke-test:
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name: Signing key smoke test
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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if: github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch'
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steps:
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- uses: actions/checkout@v4
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- uses: actions/setup-python@v5
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with:
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python-version: "3.12"
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- name: Install dependencies
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run: pip install cryptography
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- name: Sign a throwaway manifest and verify against the shipped pubkey
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env:
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RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY }}
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run: |
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if [ -z "$RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY" ]; then
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echo "FAIL: RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY secret is not set."
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echo "Generate it with: python catalog_console.py show-seed-b64"
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echo "then add it under Settings -> Actions -> Secrets."
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exit 1
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fi
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mkdir -p smoke && echo "smoke test payload" > smoke/hello.txt
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python3 scripts/sign_checksums.py generate smoke --out smoke/SHA256SUMS
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python3 scripts/sign_checksums.py sign --sums smoke/SHA256SUMS --out smoke/SHA256SUMS.sig
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python - <<'PY'
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import base64, pathlib, sys
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import bcc_core as c
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from scripts.sign_checksums import verify_checksums
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# The public half that ships inside the binary. If the secret is a
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# DIFFERENT key than the one users' copies trust, this fails here --
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# which is the entire point of the job.
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pub_b64 = base64.b64encode(c.CATALOG_PUBKEYS[0]).decode()
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sums = pathlib.Path("smoke/SHA256SUMS").read_text()
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sig = pathlib.Path("smoke/SHA256SUMS.sig").read_bytes()
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if not verify_checksums(pub_b64, sums, sig):
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sys.exit(
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"FAIL: the signature produced by RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY does NOT verify\n"
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"against the public key in bcc_core.CATALOG_PUBKEYS.\n"
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"\n"
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"The secret and the shipped public key are different keypairs. Users\n"
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"would reject every signature this CI produces. Re-copy the seed from\n"
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"`catalog_console.py show-seed-b64`, or update CATALOG_PUBKEYS."
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)
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print("OK: RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY matches the public key shipped in bcc_core.")
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PY
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# ── Create GitHub Release with all three artifacts ──────────────────────
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release:
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