diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.yml
index fa53fbc..ba3ab86 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml
@@ -68,3 +68,61 @@ jobs:
 
       - name: Run tests
         run: python -m pytest -v
+
+  # ── Catalog signature gate (#61) ─────────────────────────────────────────
+  #
+  # data/catalog.json is a list of command+args entries that BCC writes into
+  # the user's Claude config, which Claude then EXECUTES. The catalog is only
+  # trusted if it carries a valid Ed25519 signature from the maintainer key.
+  #
+  # The threat this gate exists for is NOT an outsider pushing to the repo —
+  # it is the maintainer merging a friendly-looking PR without really reading
+  # it. A contributor can change catalog.json but cannot produce a matching
+  # signature, so a blindly-merged PR lands here as a RED BUILD within a
+  # minute, instead of quietly riding into the next release.
+  #
+  # Public-key verification only. No secret is used or needed.
+  catalog-signature:
+    name: Catalog signature
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.12"
+
+      - name: Install dependencies
+        run: pip install cryptography
+
+      - name: Verify data/catalog.json.sig
+        run: |
+          python - <<'PY'
+          import pathlib, sys
+          import bcc_core as c
+
+          raw = pathlib.Path("data/catalog.json").read_bytes()
+          sig_path = pathlib.Path("data/catalog.json.sig")
+
+          if not sig_path.exists():
+              sys.exit("FAIL: data/catalog.json.sig is missing. The catalog must be "
+                       "signed via the Catalog Console (#62) before it can land.")
+
+          if b"\x00" * 32 in c.CATALOG_PUBKEYS:
+              sys.exit("FAIL: CATALOG_PUBKEYS still holds the placeholder key.")
+
+          if not c.verify_catalog_signature(raw, sig_path.read_bytes(), c.CATALOG_PUBKEYS):
+              sys.exit(
+                  "FAIL: data/catalog.json does NOT match its signature.\n"
+                  "\n"
+                  "The catalog changed without being re-signed. Either someone edited\n"
+                  "it directly (a PR you merged?), or a signing pass was forgotten.\n"
+                  "Re-review and re-sign with the Catalog Console — do not bypass this."
+              )
+
+          problems = c.validate_catalog(c.load_catalog(raw))
+          if problems:
+              sys.exit("FAIL: catalog failed validation:\n  " + "\n  ".join(problems))
+
+          print("OK: catalog signature verifies and the catalog validates clean.")
+          PY
diff --git a/.github/workflows/release.yml b/.github/workflows/release.yml
index 59fca06..616ed94 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/release.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/release.yml
@@ -95,6 +95,69 @@ jobs:
           name: ${{ matrix.artifact }}
           path: ${{ matrix.artifact }}
 
+  # ── Signing-key smoke test (workflow_dispatch only) ─────────────────────
+  #
+  # The Publish job is gated on a tag, so a manual run never exercises the
+  # signing step — which means a wrong/missing RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY secret
+  # would only be discovered at the worst possible moment: during a real
+  # release. This job signs a throwaway manifest with the secret and verifies
+  # the result against the PUBLIC key already compiled into bcc_core.
+  #
+  # It proves the two halves of the keypair actually match, without
+  # publishing anything. Run it from the Actions tab after setting or
+  # rotating the secret.
+  signing-smoke-test:
+    name: Signing key smoke test
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    if: github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch'
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.12"
+
+      - name: Install dependencies
+        run: pip install cryptography
+
+      - name: Sign a throwaway manifest and verify against the shipped pubkey
+        env:
+          RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY }}
+        run: |
+          if [ -z "$RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY" ]; then
+            echo "FAIL: RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY secret is not set."
+            echo "Generate it with: python catalog_console.py show-seed-b64"
+            echo "then add it under Settings -> Actions -> Secrets."
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          mkdir -p smoke && echo "smoke test payload" > smoke/hello.txt
+          python3 scripts/sign_checksums.py generate smoke --out smoke/SHA256SUMS
+          python3 scripts/sign_checksums.py sign --sums smoke/SHA256SUMS --out smoke/SHA256SUMS.sig
+          python - <<'PY'
+          import base64, pathlib, sys
+          import bcc_core as c
+          from scripts.sign_checksums import verify_checksums
+
+          # The public half that ships inside the binary. If the secret is a
+          # DIFFERENT key than the one users' copies trust, this fails here --
+          # which is the entire point of the job.
+          pub_b64 = base64.b64encode(c.CATALOG_PUBKEYS[0]).decode()
+
+          sums = pathlib.Path("smoke/SHA256SUMS").read_text()
+          sig = pathlib.Path("smoke/SHA256SUMS.sig").read_bytes()
+
+          if not verify_checksums(pub_b64, sums, sig):
+              sys.exit(
+                  "FAIL: the signature produced by RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY does NOT verify\n"
+                  "against the public key in bcc_core.CATALOG_PUBKEYS.\n"
+                  "\n"
+                  "The secret and the shipped public key are different keypairs. Users\n"
+                  "would reject every signature this CI produces. Re-copy the seed from\n"
+                  "`catalog_console.py show-seed-b64`, or update CATALOG_PUBKEYS."
+              )
+          print("OK: RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY matches the public key shipped in bcc_core.")
+          PY
+
   # ── Create GitHub Release with all three artifacts ──────────────────────
 
   release: