the_og 6fce19cc67 ci: gate the catalog signature, smoke-test the release key (#61, #63) ...

Two gaps closed now that a real key exists.

1. CI 'Catalog signature' job (the #61 gate): every push/PR verifies
   data/catalog.json against data/catalog.json.sig using the public key in
   bcc_core, and runs validate_catalog. The threat model here is not an
   outsider pushing to the repo -- it is merging a friendly-looking PR
   without really reading it. A contributor can change catalog.json but
   cannot produce a matching signature, so a blindly-merged PR now lands as
   a red build within a minute instead of quietly riding into the next
   release. Public-key only; no secret involved.

2. release.yml 'Signing key smoke test' (workflow_dispatch only): the
   Publish job is gated on a tag, so a manual run never exercised signing --
   a wrong or missing RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY would first surface during a real
   release. This signs a throwaway manifest with the secret and verifies it
   against the public key compiled into bcc_core, proving the two halves of
   the keypair actually match. Publishes nothing.

2026-07-12 18:30:30 -04:00

..

ci.yml

ci: gate the catalog signature, smoke-test the release key (#61, #63)

2026-07-12 18:30:30 -04:00

release.yml

ci: gate the catalog signature, smoke-test the release key (#61, #63)

2026-07-12 18:30:30 -04:00