name: CI

on:
  push:
    branches: [main]
  pull_request:
  workflow_dispatch:

jobs:
  lint:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    name: Lint (ruff)
    steps:
      - name: Checkout
        uses: actions/checkout@v4

      - name: Set up Python 3.12
        uses: actions/setup-python@v5
        with:
          python-version: "3.12"

      - name: Install ruff
        run: pip install ruff

      - name: ruff check
        run: ruff check .

      - name: ruff format --check
        run: ruff format --check .

  test:
    runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
    name: Tests (py${{ matrix.python }} / ${{ matrix.os }})
    strategy:
      fail-fast: false
      matrix:
        os: [ubuntu-latest]
        python: ["3.10", "3.12", "3.13"]
        include:
          # Windows tests on 3.12 only — the version the release binaries ship
          # with. The self-hosted Windows runner blocks setup-python's install
          # script (PowerShell execution policy), so it uses the host's `py`
          # launcher + venv, same as release.yml.
          - os: windows-latest
            python: "3.12"
    steps:
      - name: Checkout
        uses: actions/checkout@v4

      - name: Set up Python ${{ matrix.python }} (Linux)
        if: runner.os == 'Linux'
        uses: actions/setup-python@v5
        with:
          python-version: ${{ matrix.python }}

      - name: Set up Python venv (Windows)
        if: runner.os == 'Windows'
        shell: pwsh
        run: |
          py -${{ matrix.python }} -m venv .venv
          Add-Content -Path $env:GITHUB_PATH -Value "$env:GITHUB_WORKSPACE\.venv\Scripts"

      # bcc_core has no GUI imports, so the test suite needs no PySide6 —
      # keeps CI fast and avoids Qt system-library headaches on the runner.
      # cryptography is for tests/test_checksums.py (release signing helper).
      - name: Install test dependencies
        run: pip install pytest cryptography

      - name: Run tests
        run: python -m pytest -v

  # ── Catalog signature gate (#61) ─────────────────────────────────────────
  #
  # data/catalog.json is a list of command+args entries that BCC writes into
  # the user's Claude config, which Claude then EXECUTES. The catalog is only
  # trusted if it carries a valid Ed25519 signature from the maintainer key.
  #
  # The threat this gate exists for is NOT an outsider pushing to the repo —
  # it is the maintainer merging a friendly-looking PR without really reading
  # it. A contributor can change catalog.json but cannot produce a matching
  # signature, so a blindly-merged PR lands here as a RED BUILD within a
  # minute, instead of quietly riding into the next release.
  #
  # Public-key verification only. No secret is used or needed.
  catalog-signature:
    name: Catalog signature
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4

      - uses: actions/setup-python@v5
        with:
          python-version: "3.12"

      - name: Install dependencies
        run: pip install cryptography

      # 🔴 TRUST ANCHOR — issue #68 finding 4.
      #
      # This step used to do `import bcc_core as c` FROM THE CHECKED-OUT PR
      # BRANCH and verify the catalog against c.CATALOG_PUBKEYS — i.e. it
      # trusted the public key shipped in the very diff it was reviewing. A
      # PR that changed data/catalog.json AND bcc_core.CATALOG_PUBKEYS (to
      # an attacker key, with a matching signature produced by the attacker's
      # matching private key) went green, because there was nothing outside
      # the PR's own content to check the key against. The gate's whole
      # point is catching a friendly-looking PR the maintainer merges
      # without really reading it — and that hole made it a two-file diff.
      #
      # EXPECTED_CATALOG_PUBKEY_B64 below is hardcoded HERE, in the workflow
      # file, independent of whatever bcc_core.py says on the PR branch. It
      # is intentionally the only line in this step that matters for
      # security review: changing it changes what this gate is willing to
      # trust. THIS CONSTANT IS A TRUST ANCHOR. A PR that changes this line
      # in the same diff as a catalog change is exactly the attack this gate
      # exists to prevent — review a change to this line on its own,
      # never bundled with a catalog update.
      #
      # NOTE for the next key rotation: update EXPECTED_CATALOG_PUBKEY_B64
      # below to the new key's base64 form, as its own reviewed change.
      - name: Verify data/catalog.json.sig
        env:
          EXPECTED_CATALOG_PUBKEY_B64: "0s24PmkZcTT5yxNDdyTPHl5fyxArrHNPJKBjnXoQd8k="
        run: |
          python - <<'PY'
          import base64, os, pathlib, sys
          import bcc_core as c

          expected_pubkey_b64 = os.environ["EXPECTED_CATALOG_PUBKEY_B64"]

          raw = pathlib.Path("data/catalog.json").read_bytes()
          sig_path = pathlib.Path("data/catalog.json.sig")

          if not sig_path.exists():
              sys.exit("FAIL: data/catalog.json.sig is missing. The catalog must be "
                       "signed via the Catalog Console (#62) before it can land.")

          if b"\x00" * 32 in c.CATALOG_PUBKEYS:
              sys.exit("FAIL: CATALOG_PUBKEYS still holds the placeholder key.")

          # Trust anchor check FIRST, before verifying anything against
          # bcc_core.CATALOG_PUBKEYS: a PR is not allowed to bring its own
          # key. CATALOG_PUBKEYS on the checked-out branch must be EXACTLY
          # the key(s) this workflow file itself expects -- no more, no
          # fewer, no substitutions.
          actual_pubkeys_b64 = [base64.b64encode(k).decode() for k in c.CATALOG_PUBKEYS]
          if actual_pubkeys_b64 != [expected_pubkey_b64]:
              sys.exit(
                  "FAIL: bcc_core.CATALOG_PUBKEYS on this branch does not match the "
                  "trust anchor hardcoded in .github/workflows/ci.yml.\n"
                  f"  expected: {[expected_pubkey_b64]}\n"
                  f"  actual:   {actual_pubkeys_b64}\n"
                  "\n"
                  "This PR is changing (or has changed) the catalog signing key. That "
                  "change must be reviewed on its own, separately from any catalog "
                  "content change, and the workflow's EXPECTED_CATALOG_PUBKEY_B64 "
                  "updated deliberately -- not accepted because it happened to match "
                  "whatever bcc_core.py says on this branch."
              )

          if not c.verify_catalog_signature(raw, sig_path.read_bytes(), c.CATALOG_PUBKEYS):
              sys.exit(
                  "FAIL: data/catalog.json does NOT match its signature.\n"
                  "\n"
                  "The catalog changed without being re-signed. Either someone edited\n"
                  "it directly (a PR you merged?), or a signing pass was forgotten.\n"
                  "Re-review and re-sign with the Catalog Console — do not bypass this."
              )

          problems = c.validate_catalog(c.load_catalog(raw))
          if problems:
              sys.exit("FAIL: catalog failed validation:\n  " + "\n  ".join(problems))

          print("OK: catalog signature verifies, the pubkey matches the CI trust anchor, "
                "and the catalog validates clean.")
          PY