Two gaps closed now that a real key exists.
1. CI 'Catalog signature' job (the #61 gate): every push/PR verifies
data/catalog.json against data/catalog.json.sig using the public key in
bcc_core, and runs validate_catalog. The threat model here is not an
outsider pushing to the repo -- it is merging a friendly-looking PR
without really reading it. A contributor can change catalog.json but
cannot produce a matching signature, so a blindly-merged PR now lands as
a red build within a minute instead of quietly riding into the next
release. Public-key only; no secret involved.
2. release.yml 'Signing key smoke test' (workflow_dispatch only): the
Publish job is gated on a tag, so a manual run never exercised signing --
a wrong or missing RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY would first surface during a real
release. This signs a throwaway manifest with the secret and verifies it
against the public key compiled into bcc_core, proving the two halves of
the keypair actually match. Publishes nothing.
Publish SHA256SUMS for every release archive and sign it with a
detached Ed25519 signature (SHA256SUMS.sig), since paid code signing
(macOS Developer ID, Windows Authenticode) and Sigstore keyless (needs
a Fulcio-trusted OIDC issuer; self-hosted Gitea isn't one) are both
out of budget/scope.
- scripts/sign_checksums.py: dependency-light (cryptography only)
helper to hash a directory of files into a sha256sum(1)-compatible
SHA256SUMS manifest, sign it (domain-separated: b"bcc-release-v1|"
+ raw manifest bytes), and verify a signature. CLI has generate/
sign/verify subcommands; verify doubles as the check path.
- tests/test_checksums.py: 15 unit + CLI-subprocess tests covering
hashing, manifest formatting, sign/verify roundtrip, tamper
detection, wrong-key rejection, domain-separation, and the
no-key-provided failure path (must error, never write an empty/
bogus .sig).
- .github/workflows/release.yml: Publish Release job now checks out
the repo, flattens build artifacts, generates SHA256SUMS, and signs
it from the RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY secret (base64 raw Ed25519 seed) if
present. If the secret is absent, the release still publishes with
a loud ::warning:: and no .sig — it never fails the release or
publishes a bogus signature.
- README.md: new 'Verifying your download' section with the (still
placeholder) public key, sha256sum -c / Get-FileHash commands, and
an explicit statement that this does not remove Gatekeeper/
SmartScreen warnings.
- requirements-dev.txt / ci.yml: add cryptography as a dev/test
dependency for the new script and its tests.
Touches no files from bcc_core.py / tests/test_core.py /
pyproject.toml / bcc.spec to avoid colliding with concurrent work on
those files.
The self-hosted Windows runner's PowerShell execution policy rejects
setup-python's install script, so Windows mirrors release.yml: py -3.12
+ venv (the version the release binaries ship with). Linux keeps the
full 3.10/3.12/3.13 setup-python matrix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
the_og