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the_og 88e93edc6c catalog: pin exact package versions, drop firecrawl, add last_release
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- Pin every basic-tier entry to an exact published version (npm @x.y.z,
  uvx @x.y.z, docker :tag). Unpinned npx -y <pkg> means a package
  compromised AFTER we ship auto-upgrades into every user; a pin bounds
  supply-chain compromise to versions we actually reviewed.
- Drop firecrawl from the seed (19 entries). npm publish rights are held
  solely by hello_sideguide/sideguide.dev, which has no visible
  relationship to firecrawl.dev, while the package is presented as
  official. Publisher identity we cannot tie to the vendor is exactly
  what this catalog must not execute on a user's machine. Retained in the
  research pool pending confirmation.
- postgres: ship --access-mode=restricted, not unrestricted. A curated
  catalog must not default to handing an LLM write access to your DB.
- Add last_release (ISO date, from the live registry) so the UI can show
  freshness; postgres-mcp and mcp-obsidian are both ~14mo stale.
2026-07-12 17:35:48 -04:00
Cowork Agent 48904c7787 feat: MCP server catalog core -- signed, validated, resolvable (#10, #61)
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Phase 1 of the MCP server catalog: pure, GUI-free core functions plus the
seed data/catalog.json (20 servers). No GUI wiring in this PR -- bcc.py is
untouched; a follow-up PR adds the picker dialog.

- load_catalog(): strict json.loads ONLY. The lenient repair pipeline
  (repair_json_text / parse_pasted_json*) is never used on catalog bytes,
  by design and by comment, so a signature always authenticates exactly
  what gets parsed.
- validate_catalog(): rejects the whole file (not per-entry) on: bad
  schema/version types, missing tier-appropriate fields (basic needs
  config.command+args, link-only needs docs_url and no config), a
  command allowlist (npx/uvx/docker/node/python/python3 only), -e/--eval/-c
  denial for node/python, --privileged and root/$HOME volume-mount denial
  for docker, non-empty env_required values (hard rejection -- secrets
  never ship in the catalog), secret-looking args (reuses
  _TOKEN_PREFIXES/_is_secret_value rather than reimplementing), non-https
  URL fields, and non-ASCII code points in id/command/args (homoglyph
  defence).
- verify_catalog_signature(): Ed25519 via the cryptography package,
  domain-separated message (the literal prefix "bcc-catalog-v1|" + raw
  bytes), accepts a match against any key in CATALOG_PUBKEYS
  (rotation-ready), never raises.
- resolve_catalog(): picks the highest version among bundled/cached/remote
  candidates that EACH independently pass verify + validate -- the bundled
  catalog gets no implicit trust, closing the hole where an unsigned
  payload merged to main would win on being local. Anti-rollback (never
  regress below the best verified candidate already in hand) and
  anti-freeze (reject a jump of more than 1000 versions) built in.
- catalog_entry_to_paste_json() / config_has_unfilled_placeholders(): small
  pure helpers the future GUI dialog will use to feed a catalog pick into
  the existing paste-import path and to gate Save on unfilled placeholder
  tokens.

data/catalog.json: the provided 20-server seed, with a signed_at field
added at the top level (lives inside the signed payload once real signing
lands in #62). Wired into bcc.spec's PyInstaller datas so it bundles into
the frozen app.

Security requirements from the issue, and where they landed:
- Catalog bytes never touch the lenient JSON repair path -- enforced by
  load_catalog()'s strict json.loads and a comment warning against wiring
  it in later.
- env_required values are a hard rejection when non-empty, not a warning.
- Secret-looking args are rejected at validation time, reusing the
  existing secret-detection helpers instead of duplicating them.
- Non-ASCII id/command/args rejected (typosquat/homoglyph defence).
- URL fields restricted to https://.
- Ed25519 signature verification is domain-separated and never raises.
- The bundled catalog is verified at runtime exactly like remote/cached --
  no implicit trust for being local.
- Anti-rollback and anti-freeze bounds on resolve_catalog's version
  comparison.

Tests: 42 new tests added to tests/test_core.py (full suite: 239 passed,
1 pre-existing unrelated skip). ruff check and ruff format --check both
clean.
2026-07-12 17:32:50 -04:00