Sign release checksums with Ed25519 (#63)
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Publish SHA256SUMS for every release archive and sign it with a
detached Ed25519 signature (SHA256SUMS.sig), since paid code signing
(macOS Developer ID, Windows Authenticode) and Sigstore keyless (needs
a Fulcio-trusted OIDC issuer; self-hosted Gitea isn't one) are both
out of budget/scope.

- scripts/sign_checksums.py: dependency-light (cryptography only)
  helper to hash a directory of files into a sha256sum(1)-compatible
  SHA256SUMS manifest, sign it (domain-separated: b"bcc-release-v1|"
  + raw manifest bytes), and verify a signature. CLI has generate/
  sign/verify subcommands; verify doubles as the check path.
- tests/test_checksums.py: 15 unit + CLI-subprocess tests covering
  hashing, manifest formatting, sign/verify roundtrip, tamper
  detection, wrong-key rejection, domain-separation, and the
  no-key-provided failure path (must error, never write an empty/
  bogus .sig).
- .github/workflows/release.yml: Publish Release job now checks out
  the repo, flattens build artifacts, generates SHA256SUMS, and signs
  it from the RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY secret (base64 raw Ed25519 seed) if
  present. If the secret is absent, the release still publishes with
  a loud ::warning:: and no .sig — it never fails the release or
  publishes a bogus signature.
- README.md: new 'Verifying your download' section with the (still
  placeholder) public key, sha256sum -c / Get-FileHash commands, and
  an explicit statement that this does not remove Gatekeeper/
  SmartScreen warnings.
- requirements-dev.txt / ci.yml: add cryptography as a dev/test
  dependency for the new script and its tests.

Touches no files from bcc_core.py / tests/test_core.py /
pyproject.toml / bcc.spec to avoid colliding with concurrent work on
those files.
This commit is contained in:
BCC Agent
2026-07-12 17:30:09 -04:00
parent e6b60e94e7
commit cd38fd0c78
6 changed files with 599 additions and 2 deletions
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"""Tests for scripts/sign_checksums.py: SHA256SUMS generation and detached
Ed25519 signing/verification for release artifacts."""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import subprocess
import sys
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "scripts"))
import sign_checksums as sc
cryptography = pytest.importorskip("cryptography")
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey # noqa: E402
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import Encoding, PublicFormat # noqa: E402
def _make_keypair() -> tuple[str, str]:
"""Return (seed_b64, pubkey_b64) for a fresh Ed25519 keypair."""
private_key = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate()
seed = private_key.private_bytes_raw()
pubkey = private_key.public_key().public_bytes(Encoding.Raw, PublicFormat.Raw)
return base64.b64encode(seed).decode("ascii"), base64.b64encode(pubkey).decode("ascii")
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# sha256_file / build_checksums_text / generate_checksums
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
def test_sha256_file_matches_hashlib(tmp_path):
f = tmp_path / "a.txt"
f.write_bytes(b"hello world")
import hashlib
assert sc.sha256_file(f) == hashlib.sha256(b"hello world").hexdigest()
def test_build_checksums_text_sorted_and_formatted():
files = {"zeta.zip": "aa" * 32, "alpha.zip": "bb" * 32}
text = sc.build_checksums_text(files)
lines = text.splitlines()
assert lines[0].endswith("alpha.zip")
assert lines[1].endswith("zeta.zip")
# Standard sha256sum format: hash, two spaces, filename.
assert lines[0] == f"{'bb' * 32} alpha.zip"
def test_build_checksums_text_empty():
assert sc.build_checksums_text({}) == ""
def test_generate_checksums_from_directory(tmp_path):
(tmp_path / "b.bin").write_bytes(b"second")
(tmp_path / "a.bin").write_bytes(b"first")
(tmp_path / "subdir").mkdir()
(tmp_path / "subdir" / "ignored.bin").write_bytes(b"nested, not hashed")
text = sc.generate_checksums(tmp_path)
lines = text.splitlines()
assert len(lines) == 2
assert lines[0].endswith("a.bin")
assert lines[1].endswith("b.bin")
assert "subdir" not in text
def test_generate_checksums_excludes_manifest_files(tmp_path):
(tmp_path / "archive.zip").write_bytes(b"payload")
(tmp_path / "SHA256SUMS").write_text("stale")
(tmp_path / "SHA256SUMS.sig").write_bytes(b"stale-sig")
text = sc.generate_checksums(tmp_path, exclude={"SHA256SUMS", "SHA256SUMS.sig"})
assert "archive.zip" in text
assert "SHA256SUMS" not in text.replace("archive.zip", "")
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# sign_checksums / verify_checksums
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
def test_sign_then_verify_roundtrip():
seed_b64, pubkey_b64 = _make_keypair()
sums_text = "deadbeef" * 8 + " BetterClaudeConfig-Linux.tar.gz\n"
signature = sc.sign_checksums(seed_b64, sums_text)
assert len(signature) == 64
assert sc.verify_checksums(pubkey_b64, sums_text, signature) is True
def test_verify_rejects_tampered_checksums():
seed_b64, pubkey_b64 = _make_keypair()
sums_text = "aa" * 32 + " file.zip\n"
signature = sc.sign_checksums(seed_b64, sums_text)
tampered = "bb" * 32 + " file.zip\n"
assert sc.verify_checksums(pubkey_b64, tampered, signature) is False
def test_verify_rejects_wrong_key():
seed_b64, _ = _make_keypair()
_, other_pubkey_b64 = _make_keypair()
sums_text = "cc" * 32 + " file.zip\n"
signature = sc.sign_checksums(seed_b64, sums_text)
assert sc.verify_checksums(other_pubkey_b64, sums_text, signature) is False
def test_domain_prefix_is_applied():
"""The signed message must be prefixed, not the raw manifest bytes --
otherwise a signature over this manifest could be replayed as a
signature over an unrelated message with the same bytes elsewhere."""
seed_b64, pubkey_b64 = _make_keypair()
sums_text = "11" * 32 + " file.zip\n"
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey as PK
seed = base64.b64decode(seed_b64)
raw_signature = PK.from_private_bytes(seed).sign(sums_text.encode("utf-8"))
# A signature over the raw (unprefixed) bytes must NOT verify via our
# domain-separated verify function.
assert sc.verify_checksums(pubkey_b64, sums_text, raw_signature) is False
# But our own sign_checksums() output does verify.
good_signature = sc.sign_checksums(seed_b64, sums_text)
assert sc.verify_checksums(pubkey_b64, sums_text, good_signature) is True
def test_sign_checksums_rejects_bad_seed_length():
bad_seed_b64 = base64.b64encode(b"too-short").decode("ascii")
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
sc.sign_checksums(bad_seed_b64, "irrelevant\n")
def test_verify_checksums_rejects_bad_pubkey_length():
seed_b64, _ = _make_keypair()
sig = sc.sign_checksums(seed_b64, "irrelevant\n")
bad_pubkey_b64 = base64.b64encode(b"too-short").decode("ascii")
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
sc.verify_checksums(bad_pubkey_b64, "irrelevant\n", sig)
def test_public_key_b64_from_seed_matches_generated_pubkey():
seed_b64, pubkey_b64 = _make_keypair()
assert sc.public_key_b64_from_seed(seed_b64) == pubkey_b64
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# CLI (end-to-end, via subprocess so argparse wiring is exercised too)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
SCRIPT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "scripts" / "sign_checksums.py"
def _run(*args, env=None):
return subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, str(SCRIPT), *args],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
env=env,
)
def test_cli_generate_sign_verify_roundtrip(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
seed_b64, pubkey_b64 = _make_keypair()
release_dir = tmp_path / "release-files"
release_dir.mkdir()
(release_dir / "BetterClaudeConfig-Linux.tar.gz").write_bytes(b"fake archive contents")
(release_dir / "BetterClaudeConfig-macOS.zip").write_bytes(b"fake zip contents")
sums_path = release_dir / "SHA256SUMS"
sig_path = release_dir / "SHA256SUMS.sig"
gen = _run("generate", str(release_dir), "--out", str(sums_path))
assert gen.returncode == 0, gen.stderr
assert sums_path.exists()
body = sums_path.read_text()
assert "BetterClaudeConfig-Linux.tar.gz" in body
assert "BetterClaudeConfig-macOS.zip" in body
sign = _run("sign", "--sums", str(sums_path), "--out", str(sig_path), "--key-b64", seed_b64)
assert sign.returncode == 0, sign.stderr
assert sig_path.exists()
assert sig_path.stat().st_size == 64
verify = _run(
"verify",
"--sums",
str(sums_path),
"--sig",
str(sig_path),
"--pubkey-b64",
pubkey_b64,
)
assert verify.returncode == 0, verify.stderr
assert "OK" in verify.stdout
def test_cli_sign_without_key_fails_loudly(tmp_path):
sums_path = tmp_path / "SHA256SUMS"
sums_path.write_text("aa" * 32 + " file.zip\n")
sig_path = tmp_path / "SHA256SUMS.sig"
import os
env = {k: v for k, v in os.environ.items() if k != "RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY"}
result = _run("sign", "--sums", str(sums_path), "--out", str(sig_path), env=env)
assert result.returncode != 0
assert not sig_path.exists(), "must never write a bogus/empty signature file"
assert "no signing key" in result.stderr.lower()
def test_cli_verify_detects_tampering(tmp_path):
seed_b64, pubkey_b64 = _make_keypair()
sums_path = tmp_path / "SHA256SUMS"
sums_path.write_text("aa" * 32 + " file.zip\n")
sig_path = tmp_path / "SHA256SUMS.sig"
_run("sign", "--sums", str(sums_path), "--out", str(sig_path), "--key-b64", seed_b64)
sums_path.write_text("bb" * 32 + " file.zip\n") # tamper after signing
verify = _run(
"verify",
"--sums",
str(sums_path),
"--sig",
str(sig_path),
"--pubkey-b64",
pubkey_b64,
)
assert verify.returncode != 0
assert "FAILED" in verify.stdout + verify.stderr