feat(catalog-console): a keys status command, and complete rotation without a red main (#62, #68)
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Two problems from issue #68's follow-up review:

1. The maintainer -- the only person who will ever use this tool -- cannot
   reliably tell which of the two signing keys is which or what state
   either is in. He already pasted a private key into a chat window
   because a prompt was ambiguous. That's a defect in this tool, not user
   error.

2. PR #71 rotates bcc_core.CATALOG_PUBKEYS, which makes
   data/catalog.json.sig (signed by the retired key) stop verifying and
   the CI catalog-signature job go red. The Console could previously only
   load/sign against `main`, so the only way through was to merge a red
   PR and fix main afterwards -- normalizing exactly the alarm fatigue
   this whole design exists to prevent.

Task 1 -- `python catalog_console.py keys`:
  A plain-English-first status report for BOTH keys: purpose, where the
  private half lives, whether it exists locally, its fingerprint, whether
  that fingerprint matches every place its public half is expected to be
  committed (bcc_core.CATALOG_PUBKEYS, ci.yml's trust anchor, and
  scripts/sign_checksums.RELEASE_PUBKEYS -- checked independently, since
  issue #68 finding 4 was exactly bcc_core.py and ci.yml silently
  drifting apart), and whether data/catalog.json.sig currently verifies --
  ending with the exact command to run next. Needs no passphrase and never
  touches private key bytes: a plaintext public-key cache
  (store_public_key/load_public_key) is written alongside the existing
  encrypted private blob at keygen time, precisely so this command can
  report a fingerprint without decrypting anything.

  The status/report logic (key_status, render_key_status_report,
  recommend_next_steps, fingerprint_pubkey, extract_pubkey_list_literal,
  extract_ci_trust_anchor_pubkey) is pure and lives in catalog_review.py;
  cmd_keys in catalog_console.py is a thin printer over it, per the
  project's existing pure-core/thin-GUI split.

Task 2 -- rotation completable without a red main:
  ReviewWindow now offers a "current branch" source (auto-detected via
  `current_branch()`, or --ref to name one explicitly) alongside "main"
  and open PRs. Loading it runs the exact same diff-against-last-signed /
  rotation-detection logic "main" always used (_load_own_ref, extracted
  from the old hardcoded-to-main _on_load), just parameterized on the
  ref. Signing now pushes to session.loaded_ref, never a hardcoded "main"
  (commit_and_push_signed_catalog's branch param was already there --
  only the call site was wrong). The ref-list computation itself is a
  pure function (compute_own_refs) so this seam is unit-testable without
  git or Qt. None of can_sign()'s guards (empty-diff, acknowledge-all,
  blocking-risk, TOCTOU) were touched.

  This lets a rotation branch be reviewed, re-attested (every entry,
  since the new key never vouched for any of them -- issue #68 finding 5
  follow-up), signed, and pushed to ITS OWN branch before it's ever
  merged.

Task 3 -- label the keys everywhere:
  PassphraseDialog now shows which key (CATALOG vs RELEASE) and its
  fingerprint before the passphrase field, both in its window title and
  its prompt text -- the exact ambiguity that led to a private key being
  pasted into a chat window. cmd_keygen's stored-key confirmation now
  reads "CATALOG private key encrypted..." / "RELEASE private key
  encrypted..." instead of a capitalized-lowercase kind. The reattest
  banner now says "CATALOG signing key" / "CATALOG key" throughout
  instead of "the key".

PySide6's import is now guarded (try/except -> _PYSIDE6_AVAILABLE) and
every GUI class definition that depends on it moved under
`if _PYSIDE6_AVAILABLE:`. `keygen`, `show-seed-b64`, and the new `keys`
command have no GUI dependency and now work (and are testable) in an
environment without PySide6 -- which is exactly this repo's own `test`
CI job (pytest + cryptography only, no PySide6). `gui` fails with a clear
message instead of an ImportError stack trace if it's missing.

Tests: 26 new pure-function tests in tests/test_catalog_review.py
(fingerprint_pubkey, extract_pubkey_list_literal,
extract_ci_trust_anchor_pubkey, key_status, recommend_next_steps,
render_key_status_report) and a new tests/test_catalog_console_git.py
(14 tests) covering compute_own_refs, current_branch,
commit_and_push_signed_catalog's branch targeting, and
catalog_sig_status_on_disk against real local git repos -- importing
catalog_console.py directly, proving it works without PySide6. 400
passed, 1 skipped (pre-existing). ruff check / ruff format --check clean.
This commit is contained in:
BCC Agent
2026-07-13 13:10:36 -04:00
parent 4836c6cb48
commit aa40f8e139
5 changed files with 1513 additions and 422 deletions
+16 -1
View File
@@ -90,6 +90,21 @@ key, because they protect different things and live in different places:
| Generated with | `python catalog_console.py keygen` | `python catalog_console.py keygen --release` |
| Exported for CI with | *(never — there is no supported way to export this key)* | `python catalog_console.py show-seed-b64 --release` |
**Confused about which key is which, or what state either is in?** Run:
```bash
python catalog_console.py keys
```
It needs no passphrase (it never touches private key bytes) and prints a
plain-English report for both keys: where each private half lives, whether
it's present on this machine, its fingerprint, whether that fingerprint
matches what's actually committed in `bcc_core.py`, `ci.yml`'s trust
anchor, and `scripts/sign_checksums.py`, and whether
`data/catalog.json.sig` currently verifies — ending with the exact command
to run next for whatever state it finds. This is the check that would have
caught [issue #68](../../issues/68)'s finding 5 incident before it happened.
**Why two keys:** the catalog key is the root of trust for what BCC
actually *executes* on a user's machine — every `command`/`args` pair in
the shipped catalog is only there because this key signed it. If that key
@@ -207,7 +222,7 @@ file is also listed, marked *legacy*, so you can copy them over.
- `bcc.spec` — PyInstaller build spec (cross-platform).
- `scripts/build_icons.py` — regenerates `icons/app.icns` and `icons/app.ico` from source PNGs.
- `scripts/sign_checksums.py` — generates and Ed25519-signs the release `SHA256SUMS` manifest (see [Verifying your download](#verifying-your-download)).
- `catalog_console.py` / `catalog_review.py`**maintainer-only**, never shipped to users (excluded from `bcc.spec`; see `tests/test_catalog_console_packaging.py`). The Catalog Console: review + sign `data/catalog.json`, and generate/manage both signing keys (`keygen`, `keygen --release`) — see [Signing keys](#signing-keys).
- `catalog_console.py` / `catalog_review.py`**maintainer-only**, never shipped to users (excluded from `bcc.spec`; see `tests/test_catalog_console_packaging.py`). The Catalog Console: review + sign `data/catalog.json` (against `main`, an open PR, or the branch you have checked out — `--ref <branch>` to be explicit, e.g. mid key-rotation, so a rotation can be signed and pushed to its own branch *before* it's merged, never forcing a red `main`), generate/manage both signing keys (`keygen`, `keygen --release`), and report on their status (`keys`, no passphrase needed) — see [Signing keys](#signing-keys).
## Building from source