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better-claude-config/.github/workflows/ci.yml
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the_og 6fce19cc67
CI / Tests (py3.10 / ubuntu-latest) (push) Successful in 10s
CI / Tests (py3.12 / ubuntu-latest) (push) Successful in 10s
CI / Lint (ruff) (push) Successful in 6s
CI / Tests (py3.12 / windows-latest) (push) Successful in 23s
CI / Tests (py3.13 / ubuntu-latest) (push) Successful in 10s
CI / Catalog signature (push) Successful in 6s
ci: gate the catalog signature, smoke-test the release key (#61, #63)
Two gaps closed now that a real key exists.

1. CI 'Catalog signature' job (the #61 gate): every push/PR verifies
   data/catalog.json against data/catalog.json.sig using the public key in
   bcc_core, and runs validate_catalog. The threat model here is not an
   outsider pushing to the repo -- it is merging a friendly-looking PR
   without really reading it. A contributor can change catalog.json but
   cannot produce a matching signature, so a blindly-merged PR now lands as
   a red build within a minute instead of quietly riding into the next
   release. Public-key only; no secret involved.

2. release.yml 'Signing key smoke test' (workflow_dispatch only): the
   Publish job is gated on a tag, so a manual run never exercised signing --
   a wrong or missing RELEASE_SIGNING_KEY would first surface during a real
   release. This signs a throwaway manifest with the secret and verifies it
   against the public key compiled into bcc_core, proving the two halves of
   the keypair actually match. Publishes nothing.
2026-07-12 18:30:30 -04:00

129 lines
4.4 KiB
YAML

name: CI
on:
push:
branches: [main]
pull_request:
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
lint:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
name: Lint (ruff)
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up Python 3.12
uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
python-version: "3.12"
- name: Install ruff
run: pip install ruff
- name: ruff check
run: ruff check .
- name: ruff format --check
run: ruff format --check .
test:
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
name: Tests (py${{ matrix.python }} / ${{ matrix.os }})
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
os: [ubuntu-latest]
python: ["3.10", "3.12", "3.13"]
include:
# Windows tests on 3.12 only — the version the release binaries ship
# with. The self-hosted Windows runner blocks setup-python's install
# script (PowerShell execution policy), so it uses the host's `py`
# launcher + venv, same as release.yml.
- os: windows-latest
python: "3.12"
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up Python ${{ matrix.python }} (Linux)
if: runner.os == 'Linux'
uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
python-version: ${{ matrix.python }}
- name: Set up Python venv (Windows)
if: runner.os == 'Windows'
shell: pwsh
run: |
py -${{ matrix.python }} -m venv .venv
Add-Content -Path $env:GITHUB_PATH -Value "$env:GITHUB_WORKSPACE\.venv\Scripts"
# bcc_core has no GUI imports, so the test suite needs no PySide6 —
# keeps CI fast and avoids Qt system-library headaches on the runner.
# cryptography is for tests/test_checksums.py (release signing helper).
- name: Install test dependencies
run: pip install pytest cryptography
- name: Run tests
run: python -m pytest -v
# ── Catalog signature gate (#61) ─────────────────────────────────────────
#
# data/catalog.json is a list of command+args entries that BCC writes into
# the user's Claude config, which Claude then EXECUTES. The catalog is only
# trusted if it carries a valid Ed25519 signature from the maintainer key.
#
# The threat this gate exists for is NOT an outsider pushing to the repo —
# it is the maintainer merging a friendly-looking PR without really reading
# it. A contributor can change catalog.json but cannot produce a matching
# signature, so a blindly-merged PR lands here as a RED BUILD within a
# minute, instead of quietly riding into the next release.
#
# Public-key verification only. No secret is used or needed.
catalog-signature:
name: Catalog signature
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
python-version: "3.12"
- name: Install dependencies
run: pip install cryptography
- name: Verify data/catalog.json.sig
run: |
python - <<'PY'
import pathlib, sys
import bcc_core as c
raw = pathlib.Path("data/catalog.json").read_bytes()
sig_path = pathlib.Path("data/catalog.json.sig")
if not sig_path.exists():
sys.exit("FAIL: data/catalog.json.sig is missing. The catalog must be "
"signed via the Catalog Console (#62) before it can land.")
if b"\x00" * 32 in c.CATALOG_PUBKEYS:
sys.exit("FAIL: CATALOG_PUBKEYS still holds the placeholder key.")
if not c.verify_catalog_signature(raw, sig_path.read_bytes(), c.CATALOG_PUBKEYS):
sys.exit(
"FAIL: data/catalog.json does NOT match its signature.\n"
"\n"
"The catalog changed without being re-signed. Either someone edited\n"
"it directly (a PR you merged?), or a signing pass was forgotten.\n"
"Re-review and re-sign with the Catalog Console — do not bypass this."
)
problems = c.validate_catalog(c.load_catalog(raw))
if problems:
sys.exit("FAIL: catalog failed validation:\n " + "\n ".join(problems))
print("OK: catalog signature verifies and the catalog validates clean.")
PY